Introduction
Over the past decade, climate change litigation has been increasingly pertinent for the private sector,[1] particularly for companies engaged in high-emission operations or fossil fuel activity.[2] Of more than 3.000 documented climate change lawsuits worldwide, approximately 20% now name companies as defendants.[3] These lawsuits are deemed to be “strategic”, since the claimants do not solely seek compensation for the individualized harm and success in their individual case, but also aim to shape public discourse and compel key actors to alter their conduct regarding high-emissions.[4]
The recent advisory opinions delivered by international and regional courts put more emphasis on the responsibility of private actors, and highlight the States’ obligations to mitigate such private activities domestically.[5] The International Court of Justice, in its Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change Advisory Opinion, established that the fulfillment of international obligations requires States to exercise due diligence through domestic mitigation measures. The Court also emphasized that this due diligence obligation is not confined to public authorities; it extends to the conduct of private actors operating within a State’s jurisdiction.[6] The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in its Climate Change Advisory Opinion, also observed that the “obligation of due diligence is particularly relevant in a situation in which the activities in question are mostly carried out by private persons or entities.”[7]
To fulfill their obligations under international law and reduce national emissions, States have adopted domestic measures regulating the private sector activities, particularly those with high emissions. The European Union, in particular, has been leading the way in this regulatory activity. Through instruments such as the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD),[8] the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS)[9] and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD),[10] the EU imposes sustainability‑related obligations on private entities.
The scope of these regulations is not limited to EU-companies. Instead, they extend beyond the EU, targeting non-EU entities either with commercial or industrial activity within the EU, or that are integrated into the chain of activities of entities subject to EU law. Consequently, Turkish companies involved in the production or development of goods and services that meet the directives’ turnover thresholds must comply with these regulations. Following the publishing of the Omnibus 1 Directive amending the CSRD and CSDDD in the Official Journal of the EU on 26 February 2026,[11] compliance with these directives has become even more complex.
Similarly, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)[12] imposes direct financial obligations on exporters whose emissions exceed designated thresholds. Formally adopted on May 2023, CBAM is legally characterized as the extension of the EU Emissions Trading System Directive, an instrument designed to equalize the carbon costs between EU products and imports. Considering that the exports to the EU accounted for 41% of Türkiye’s total export volume in 2024,[13] the impact of EU law is paramount, whether Turkish companies are directly regulated or indirectly affected as part of a European chain of activities.
This article examines climate litigation cases in Europe and its direct implications for Turkish companies within the framework of EU sustainability directives. The first section provides an analysis of the CSDDD and the CSRD in light of the Omnibus 1 Directive, focusing on how these instruments expand civil liability and create new evidentiary risks. The second section explores the CBAM, highlighting its potential to trigger commercial disputes and international trade law challenges. Finally, the article investigates the EU Taxonomy and the Green Claims Directive, assessing the rising tide of greenwashing litigation and its impact on corporate accountability. By synthesizing these regulatory developments, the article concludes with strategic recommendations for Turkish businesses to navigate this new era of mandatory compliance and ‘litigation-ready’ risk management.
Climate Change Regulation in the EU and Climate Litigation Implications
Civil Liability under the CSDDD After Omnibus 1
Scope and Content
In essence, the CSDDD requires companies to manage their chain of activities, and conduct comprehensive due diligence to detect, mitigate and remedy the adverse environmental and human rights impacts arising from their operations.[14] These obligations extend beyond the company’s immediate activities, to encompass its subsidiaries and their third-party business partners involved in its chain of activities. The transposition deadline for the CSDDD, as modified by the Omnibus 1 Directive, is set for July 2028, providing Member States with additional time to align their national legislation. The resulting compliance obligations for in-scope companies will subsequently take effect in July 2029.[15]
The CSDDD, as amended by the Omnibus 1 Directive, operates through a dual-layered applicability framework that effectively projects EU standards onto the global market. While the Directive’s direct application targets only large EU and non‑EU companies, a much wider group of global companies, including Turkish companies, becomes indirectly subject once they take part in the chain of activities of a company subject to CSDDD. This structure significantly broadens the CSDDD’s extraterritorial reach.
| Category | Thresholds |
| EU Companies (Direct Application of the CSDDD)
|
· with over 5,000 employees
· €1.5 billion in net worldwide turnover.[16] |
| Non‑EU Companies (Direct Application of the CSDDD)[17] | · €1.5 billion in net turnover in the EU markets.[18] |
| Franchisors and licensors (EU & Non-EU)
|
· net turnover surpassing €275 million in the EU, and
· royalty earnings above €75 million.[19] |
| Non‑EU Companies that do not reach the turnover thresholds of the CSDDD (Indirect Application of the CSDDD) [20] | · they take part in the chain of activities of a company subject to CSDDD, either an EU or non-EU company.[21] |
Key implications for a Turkish company that will be subject to the direct application of the CSDDD can be summarized as follows:
- It is required to map its full value chain, identify and monitor risks in its chain of activities under CSDDD Article 8.[22]
- Where it identifies any adverse impacts under Article 8, it must (i) prevent potential adverse impacts, (ii) bring an end to actual adverse impacts and (iii) remediate if it causes or contributes to harm.[23]
- For such a company, Omnibus 1 narrows liability by clarifying that companies are not liable for harm to which they are merely linked, for example, harm caused by an indirect supplier over which the company had no direct involvement or control. While this limits the scope of legal liability, it does not remove the duty to identify and mitigate risks.
- While proactive engagement with indirect suppliers is no required under Omnibus 1, a Turkish company within the scope must still act in good faith to ensure that their direct suppliers implement effective due diligence practices throughout their own chain of activities.[24]
- It must establish and maintain a complaints mechanism that is accessible, transparent and responsive for all affected stakeholders, including workers, trade unions, local communities, and civil society organizations. These mechanisms must enable individuals to raise concerns or report harms related to human rights or environmental impacts linked to the company’s operations or value chain.[25]
Litigation Implications
Article 4(20) of the Omnibus 1 Directive introduces major amendments to the civil liability framework previously established by the CSDDD, especially due to its removal of paragraphs (1) and (7) of Article 29 of the CSDDD.[26] Such modifications will likely create uncertainty and increase litigation exposure for both EU and non-EU companies.
The removal of paragraph (1) of Article 29 of the CSDDD eliminates the previously planned single, harmonized EU-wide civil liability regime.[27] As a result, each Member State must enact its own national civil liability regime for CSDDD-related claims, provided that minimum requirements, such as the obligation to ensure the protection of victims against human rights violations and environmental harm resulting from business operations and to make available full compensation for victims, are met.[28]
When the deletion of paragraph (1) of CSDDD is read together with the deletion of paragraph (7), the divergence in the civil liability regime becomes even more apparent. Article 4(20) of Omnibus 1 removed paragraph (7) of Article 29 of the CSDDD, which had required Member States to treat their implementation of the CSDDD as overriding mandatory law.[29] This provision served as an important safeguard for legal certainty, especially in cases where the applicable law would otherwise be that of a third state. With its removal, EU courts may now be obliged to apply non-EU law instead of the CSDDD’s agreed standards, particularly when damages occur in third states.
As a consequence of the absence of a uniform, EU-wide liability standard, Turkish companies integrated into EU supply chains will be vulnerable to a multi-jurisdictional litigation threat. The Omnibus leaves companies exposed to a multijurisdictional ‘patchwork’, not merely of 27 national systems, but potentially more than 200 applicable civil liability regimes worldwide, further compounded by the regional divergences within them.[30] Considering that plaintiffs in European climate change litigation are not limited to European residents, but increasingly include affected communities by corporate emissions from regions as far as Indonesia[31] to Bonaire,[32] the CSDDD represents not only compliance obligations for Turkish companies, but also a significant issue in terms of cross-border dispute resolution under private international law.
Sustainability Reporting Under the CSRD After Omnibus 1
Scope and Content
The scope of the CSRD has significantly changed following the adoption of the Omnibus 1 Directive. Initially, the CSRD was designed to encompass a broader range of entities, focusing on large undertakings meeting at least two of three criteria: 250 employees, €50 million net turnover, and €25 million total assets.[33] However, to minimize the administrative burden on mid-sized entities and focus on high-impact actors, the Omnibus 1 Directive significantly raised these thresholds. The revised framework now targets EU companies with at least 1,000 staff and €450 million in revenue.[34] Non-EU parent companies are also included if they generate net turnover exceeding EUR 450 million within the EU, with an EU subsidiary or branch generating net turnover exceeding EUR 200 million.[35] The transposition deadline for the CSRD for Member States is set for March 2027. Effectively, mandatory reporting starts on 1 January 2027.[36]
The European Commission is set to formalize the revised ESRS by 18 September 2026, following the Omnibus 1 Directive. The ESRS incorporates internationally recognized classifications, namely the World Resources Institute Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol),[37] that categorize emissions as Scope 1, Scope 2, and Scope 3. Reporting and disclosing emissions in all three scopes is required under the CSRD Article 29b(2)(a).[38]
| Scope | Definition | Reporting obligations |
| Scope 1 | refers to direct greenhouse gas emissions that occur from assets under a company’s ownership or operational control.[39] | (a) the gross Scope 1 GHG emissions in metric tons of CO2eq; and
(b) the percentage of Scope 1 GHG emissions from regulated emission trading schemes.[40] |
| Scope 2 | accounts for emissions resulting from the production of purchased electricity used by the company.[41] | (a) the gross location-based Scope 2 GHG emissions in metric tons of CO2eq; and
(b) the gross market-based Scope 2 GHG emissions in metric tons of CO2eq.[42] |
| Scope 3 | encompasses all other indirect emissions that arise from the company’s broader activities, but occur at sources managed by third parties.[43] | GHG emissions in metric tons of CO2eq from each significant Scope 3 category.[44] |
In-scope Turkish companies, (with net turnover exceeding EUR 450 million within the EU, or with an EU subsidiary or branch generating net turnover exceeding EUR 200 million) are required to report not only on information necessary to understand the undertaking’s development, performance and position, but also how their operations affect environmental, social, and labor issues, as well as human rights and anti-corruption efforts. This framework introduces a “double materiality” reporting obligation: companies must disclose both their outward impact on society and the environment, and the inward impact that sustainability factors have on the company’s efforts and own financial health.[45]
Although the CSRD does not itself prescribe fines or penalties for non-compliance, Member States are under the obligation to provide “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” penalties in their national provisions.[46] Further, Member States are required to set an upper limit on corporate penalties, capping them at 3% of a company’s total global revenue.[47]
Litigation Implications
Alongside penalties in case of non-compliance with the reporting obligations, sustainability reporting also carries substantial litigation implications associated with reporting. Recent case law illustrates how companies’ own disclosures, and particularly Scope 3 emissions, shape courts’ assessments of duty of care, attribution, and causality.
Scope 3 Emissions and Expanded Corporate Responsibility:
The inclusion of Scope 3 emissions, where relevant, significantly alters how courts characterize major emitters.
In the 2024 Appeals Judgment of Milieudefensie et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell plc, the Hague Court of Appeals found that global Scope 3 emissions were both relevant for an evaluation of a company’s duty of care and within the jurisdictional scope of the court.[48] Under Shell’s own GHG Protocol based reporting, 95% of its total reported emissions were categorized as Scope 3.[49]
By accepting corporate obligations for Scope 3 emissions, the Court effectively shifted the burden of responsibility for end-user emissions back to major corporations, recognizing that these actors possess the decision-making authority necessary to mitigate the systemic environmental impacts of their respective sectors.
A similar approach is echoed in the 2025 Admissibility Decision of the Zug Cantonal Tribunal in Asmania et al. v. Holcim. In response to Holcim’s (Defendant) argument that it should not be held liable for emissions generated by its legally independent subsidiaries, the Court found the Defendant liable because “it sets out the climate strategy for the entire group in a binding manner.”[50]
Use of Sustainability Reports as Evidence in Climate Litigation:
Companies’ sustainability reports are widely used as evidence, especially with regards to attribution and the assessment of causality.
In the Appeals Judgment of Milieudefensie et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell plc, the Hague Court of Appeals, highly relied on Shell’s sustainability reports, strategy documents, initiatives and sales declarations, and production projections.[51]
Similarly, in the Admissibility Decision of the Zug Cantonal Tribunal in Asmania et al. v. Holcim, the Court effectively treated the company’s own reports as “binding evidence”, limiting the company’s ability to raise certain legal defenses. The Court also noted that because Holcim used GHG Protocol’s Scope 1, Scope 2, Scope 3 definitions in its annual reports and set percentage-based reduction targets, it could not claim that these terms were unclear.[52]
Additionally, in response to Holcim’s argument that the relief was not enforceable as it was insufficiently specific, the Court observed that since the Defendant’s emissions data were third-party verified, they constitute a reliable factual basis for legal enforcement.[53] In other words, they could be used to assess compliance. Consequently, the company’s own verified disclosures function as undisputed evidence, stripping Holcim of the ability to challenge the technical feasibility of court-ordered monitoring.[54]
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
Scope and Content
As an extension of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the EU has adopted measures to limit “carbon leakage”, a term that refers to “the transfer of CO2 emissions from one country to another when, due to strict climate policies, companies relocate their production to countries with weaker emission constraints.”[55]
In short, under the Regulation establishing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) 2023/956, entered into application in 2023 (transitional phase), carbon-intensive goods entering the EU will be priced reflecting a cost equivalent to the carbon price formed in the EU ETS.[56] Entities importing more than 50 tons of CBAM-regulated goods into the EU, whether directly or through indirect customs representatives, must obtain the status of authorized CBAM declarants. These declarants must purchase certificates from the relevant national authorities in their country of establishment, with the value of certificates tied to the EU ETS prices.[57] The CBAM definitive period started on 1 January 2026, and the first CBAM certificate price will be published on 7 April 2026.[58]
The CBAM is applied to specific products in the iron-steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizer, electricity, and hydrogen sectors.[59]
A key provision for Turkish exporters involved in CBAM sectors is the Regulation Article 9. This article allows authorized declarants to reduce the number of CBAM certificates they must surrender by deducting any carbon price effectively paid in the country of origin. To benefit from this reduction, the declarant must maintain detailed records of the paid price and prove that this was an “effective payment”.[60] Turkish exporters will be able to rely on this mechanism once the ETS established by the Turkish Climate Law.[61]
Litigation Implications
The CBAM introduces significant litigation implications for non-EU exporters, arising from different carbon-pricing mechanisms existing in different national emission trading systems.
The core of this litigation risk lies in the fundamental divergence between the “absolute cap” and “intensity-based cap” models.[62] While recently introduced emissions trading systems increasingly rely on intensity-based cap model,[63] EU operates an absolute cap model: a fixed total emissions limit that declines annually, regardless of economic growth, ensuring a predictable environmental outcome but creating a rigid price floor.[64] In contrast, the Turkish proposal for the Climate Law largely adopts an “intensity-based cap” model, where the total allowance pool is ex-post adjusted based on actual production output or energy efficiency benchmarks.[65] Although the litigation risks that will be explained below are not necessarily “climate litigation” by definition, they are disputes that arise from corporate emissions, and therefore fall under the scope of this work.
Commercial Disputes
The EU Commission may exercise its discretionary powers to partially disallow the deduction of Turkish carbon payments if the market price does not reflect the marginal abatement cost envisioned by the EU due to the discrepancy between the absolute cap and intensity-based cap. The resulting financial burden may raise questions as to who bears such burden, and claims of force majeure, hardship, or breach of warranty regarding the “CBAM-compliance” of the goods between EU importers and Turkish exporters.
International Trade Law and Treaty Arbitration
The refusal to grant full credit for domestic carbon costs may be construed as a violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, specifically the national treatment and most-favored-nation principles. Furthermore, affected entities may seek redress under bilateral investment treaties, arguing that the discriminatory application of CBAM methodologies constitutes indirect expropriation or a failure to provide fair and equitable treatment by imposing double taxation on the same unit of carbon.
EU Taxonomy and Green Claims Directive
Scope and Content
The EU Taxonomy Regulation 2020/852/EU[66] establishes a harmonized, science-based classification system for determining the extent to which an investment can be characterized as environmentally sustainable.[67] It applies to EU-level or Member State measures that impose requirements on financial market participants or issuers regarding financial products or corporate bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable.[68] Further, it directly regulates entities that offer financial products within the EU and, importantly, extends to all companies required to publish non-financial statements under the CSRD.[69] While the Taxonomy Regulation primarily targets financial market participants,[70] its impact on Turkish companies manifests through access to sustainable finance. As EU-based banks and investment funds are required to align their portfolios with Taxonomy criteria, they increasingly demand compliance from their non-EU borrowers and investees.
For an activity to qualify as “Taxonomy-aligned”, it must (i) substantially contribute to at least one of six environmental objectives; (ii) do no significant harm to any of the other objectives, and (iii) comply with minimum social safeguards.[71] The six environmental objectives are:
- climate change mitigation,
- climate change adaptation,
- the sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources,
- the transition to a circular economy,
- pollution prevention and control; and
- the protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems.[72]
Complementing the Taxonomy Regulation, the European Commission adopted the proposal for a Green Claims Directive in March 2023.[73] The proposal aims to regulate corporate environmental communication. It targets greenwashing by requiring companies to substantiate their environmental claims with robust, independent evidence. If adopted, any voluntary environmental claim made by a company in business-to-consumer communications will have to be verified by an accredited third-party and based on a lifecycle assessment methodology.[74] However, its legislative future remains uncertain as the European Commission announced its intention to withdraw the proposal and paused the legislative process as of June 2025 leaving the timeline for adoption unclear.[75]
Litigation Implications
Rising Greenwashing Litigation
Even if the Green Claims Directive is not yet adopted, and may even be withdrawn, greenwashing litigation will still be on the rise in Europe. Effectively, it is reported that in most of these cases, the plaintiffs succeed against companies, with an estimated 81% success rate,[76] even when claims were brought primarily under customer protection laws. This trend demonstrates that the EU courts have already manifested judicial inclination toward enforcing more demanding standards for validating green claims.
Landmark Case: Greenpeace France and Others v. TotalEnergies
A landmark precedent in European greenwashing litigation was established with the Greenpeace France and Others v. TotalEnergies SE and TotalEnergies Electricité et Gaz France, a case initiated in 2022 before the 34th Chamber of the Paris Judicial Court.[77] In this case, the plaintiffs relied on the French Consumer Code and Environment Code, to challenge the company’s rebranding campaign, which featured claims such as “ambition to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050” and positioning itself as a “major player in the energy transition”.[78]
The court’s reasoning pivoted the factual inconsistency between TotalEnergies’ public net-zero narrative and its simultaneous expansion of fossil fuel projects, concluding that the company has misled consumers’ economic behavior. The Court, in reaching its conclusion, mainly relied on the customer protection laws applicable in France and in the European Union. Although the Green Claims Directive was inapplicable during the rendering of the decision, the Court relied on customer protection laws in France and in the EU. It also took into consideration the Empowering Consumers Directive EU 2024/825.[79] Notably, even though Directive 2024/825 was not yet in force when the decision was rendered, the Court treated this forthcoming Directive to be a legal benchmark in its application of and the interpretation of the existing law.
Unfair Competition Law to Challenge Green Claims:
Another strategy used by plaintiffs filing greenwashing claims is to rely on laws regulating unfair competition rather than consumer protection laws. In the 2022 Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main’s decision on climate neutral claims regarding detergents, the Court found that labeling a product or company as “climate neutral” significantly influences consumer behavior.[80] It stated that the term “climate neutral” would be understood as a “balanced balance sheet”, and would be reached through emission reduction and compensation measures.[81]
A central aspect of the ruling concerned the treatment of Scope 3 emissions.[82] The Court found that consumers naturally assume that all significant pollution was being accounted for.[83] In this case, because the company ignored its Scope 3 emissions and did not warn the public about this omission, the Court ruled the advertisement was misleading and illegal.[84]
Continued Litigation Risks under the Taxonomy Regulation:
With the Taxonomy Regulation further clarifying the scientific and technical benchmarks for what is actually “green” and “sustainable”, litigation risks will persist for companies, not only in relation to their business-to-consumer communications, but also with respect to their underlying economic activities.
Conclusion
The legislative landscape of the EU has undergone a fundamental transformation, evolving from a framework of voluntary sustainability goals into a sophisticated and comprehensive regime of mandatory, enforceable legal obligations. For Turkish companies, the entry into force of the Omnibus 1 Directive in early 2026 and the definitive implementation of the CBAM signify that climate change has officially migrated from the realm of corporate social responsibility into the domain of high-stakes litigation.
In this emerging era of strategic litigation, compliance with EU directives becomes a core pillar of legal risk management for Turkish companies. To mitigate these risks, entities must move beyond mere reporting toward a robust “litigation-ready” posture, ensuring the accurate value chain mappings, reliable carbon footprints data and a clear understanding of the private international law implications inherent in EU sustainability law.
Ultimately, the ability of Turkish businesses to maintain their competitiveness in the EU market will depend on their capacity to navigate these regulations while preempting the inevitable wave of climate change lawsuits.
——
[1] Earth.org, “Climate Litigation No Longer a ‘Niche Concern’, 226 New Cases Filed in 2024: Report”, 30 June 2025, https://earth.org/climate-litigation-no-longer-a-niche-concern-as-impacts-become-increasingly-visible-report-says/, (“Earth.org Report”) accessed 06 March 2026.
[2] London School of Economics Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, “Global trends in climate change litigation: 2025 snapshot”, 25 June 2025, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/global-trends-in-climate-change-litigation-2025-snapshot/, accessed 06 March 2026; British Institute of International and Comparative Law, “Corporate Climate Litigation: Lessons Learned, Comparative Perspectives and Future Pathways”, 11 May 2023, https://www.biicl.org/documents/165_corporate_climate_litigation-_lessons_learned_comparative_perspectives_and_future_pathways.pdf, accessed 07 March 2026.
[3] World Economic Forum, “Climate litigation is evolving and businesses should take notice”, 13 January 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/climate-litigation-business-risk/, accessed 10 March 2026.
[4] Earth.org Report.
[5] Responsibilities and Obligations of States with respect to Climate Change in the Context of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, (“ITLOS Advisory Opinion”) Advisory Opinion dated 21 May 2024; Climate Emergency and Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-32/24 dated 9 January 2025; Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, the International Court of Justice, (“Climate Change Advisory Opinion”) Advisory Opinion dated 23 July 2025.
[6] Climate Change Advisory Opinion, para. 250-252.
[7] ITLOS Advisory Opinion, para. 236.
[8] Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Directive 2013/34/EU, as regards corporate sustainability reporting (“CSRD”).
[9] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2772 of 31 July 2023 supplementing Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards sustainability reporting standards (“ESRS”).
[10] Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859 (“CSDDD”).
[11] Directive (EU) 2026/470 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 February 2026 amending Directives 2006/43/EC, 2013/34/EU, (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards certain corporate sustainability reporting requirements and certain corporate sustainability due diligence requirements (“Omnibus 1 Directive”).
[12] Turkish Republic Ministry of Trade, “EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism”, https://ticaret.gov.tr/dis-iliskiler/yesil-mutabakat/ab-sinirda-karbon-duzenleme-mekanizmasi, (“Turkish Ministry of Trade on CBAM”) accessed 07 March 2026.
[13] Esra Hamamcıoğlu, Argun Karamanlıoğlu, “İklim Değişikliği ve Ortaklıklar Hukuku Kesişiminde CSDD Yönergesine İlişkin Bazı Tespitler” in İklim Hukuku, Prof. Dr. Başak Baysal, et al. (eds.), 1st edn, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, December 2025.
[14] Under the CSDDD Article 3(b), (c), and (d), “adverse environmental impacts” are specifically defined by reference to the Annex 1 Section 1 Point 15 and 16 to the Directive. These include, inter alia, violations of the prohibition on causing any measurable environmental degradation, such as soil change, water or air pollution, or harmful emissions that impairs the natural basis for the preservation and production of food or denies a person access to safe drinking water.
[15] ClientEarth, “Sustainability Due Diligence after Omnibus: Legal Implications for the CSDDD”, February 2026, https://www.clientearth.org/media/rpfkpapv/client-earth-legal-analysis_v3.pdf, (“ClientEarth Report”) accessed 07 March 2026, p.2.
[16] ClientEarth Report, p.5.
[17] The Danish Institute for Human Rights, “The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive for non-EU stakeholders: Businesses”, https://www.humanrights.dk/files/media/document/CSDDD-for-non-EU-stakeholders_Businesses_EN-a.pdf, (“DIHR Report”) accessed 07 March 2026, p.1, 4.
[18] Id.
[19] ClientEarth Report, p.5.
[20] DIHR Report, p. 4.
[21] Id.
[22] CSDDD, art. 8
[23] CSDDD, arts. 10, 11, 12.
[24] Omnibus 1 Directive, preamble para. 44.
[25] CSDDD, art. 14.
[26] Omnibus 1 Directive, art.4(20).
[27] Id.
[28] Omnibus 1 Directive, art.4(20), preamble para. 49.
[29] CSDDD, art. 29(7).
[30] Geert Van Calster, “Legal opinion: how the Omnibus creates uncertainty on civil liability for companies”, Business and Human Rights Centre, (“Van Calster Legal Opinion”) 2025, p.1, 5.
[31] Asmania et al. v. Holcim, Zug Cantonal Court, (“Asmania v. Holcim”) Interim Decision dated 17 December 2025, unofficial English translation https://callforclimatejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/Asmania-et-al-vs-Holcim_Decision-Cantonal-Court-Zug_17.12.2025_ENG.pdf, accessed 11 March 2026.
[32] Greenpeace Netherlands and 8 citizens of Bonaire v. The Netherlands, First Instance Decision dated 28 January 2026, unofficial English translation https://www.climatecasechart.com/document/greenpeace-netherlands-and-8-citizens-of-bonaire-v-the-netherlands_8731, accessed 11 March 2026.
[33] CSRD, art. 1(3).
[34] Omnibus 1 Directive, art. 2(1)(a).
[35] Omnibus 1 Directive, art. 2(2).
[36] Omnibus 1 Directive, preamble para. 4.
[37] World Resources Institute, “Greenhouse Gas Protocol, A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised Edition)”, https://ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/standards/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf, (“GHG Protocol”) accessed 11 March 2026.
[38] CSRD, art. 29b(2)(a).
[39] GHG Protocol, p.25.
[40] European Financial Reporting Advisory Group, “European Sustainability Reporting Standards E1 Climate Change”, https://www.efrag.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2024-08/ESRS%20E1%20Delegated-act-2023-5303-annex-1_en.pdf, (“ESRS E1”) accessed 11 March 2026, para. 44, 45, 48.
[41] GHG Protocol, p.25.
[42] Id.
[43] GHG Protocol, p.25.
[44] Id., para. 44, 51.
[45] CSRD, preamble para. 29.
[46] Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, art. 51; Omnibus 1 Directive, preamble para. 48.
[47] Omnibus 1 Directive, preamble para. 48.
[48] Phillip Paiement, “Towards a Bundle of Duties, Shell v. Milieudefensie Confirms Major Developments in Climate Change Liability”, Verfassungsblog, 15 November 2024, https://verfassungsblog.de/shell-milieudefensie-climate-obligations/, accessed on 11 March 2025.
[49]Milieudefensie et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell plc., The Hague Court of Appeal Decision dated November 2024, unofficial English translation https://www.climatecasechart.com/documents/milieudefensie-et-al-v-royal-dutch-shell-plc-judgment_7bfb, accessed 11 March 2026, para. 3.24.
[50] Asmania v. Holcim, para. 6.5.2.
[51] Id., paras. 3.24-3.54.
[53] Id., para. 6.3
[54] Id., para. 6.5.1
[55] European Commission Energy, Climate Change, Environment, “Carbon Leakage”, https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/free-allocation/carbon-leakage_en, accessed 11 March 2026.
[56] European Commission Taxation and Customs Union, “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism”, https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en, accessed 11 March 2026.
[57] Id.
[58] Id.
[59] Turkish Ministry of Trade on CBAM.
[60] Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, art. 9.
[61] Turkish Law No. 7552 dated 09 July 2025, Turkish Climate Law.
[62] Angela Sun, “East Meets West, Linking the China’s and EU ETS’s”, Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, June 2022, https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/KCEP-Digest46-East-Meets-West.pdf, (“Linking the China’s and EU ETS’s”) accessed 11 March 2026, p. 5; OECD, “Effective Carbon Rates 2025: Recent Trends in Taxes on Energy Use and Carbon Pricing”, OECD Series on Carbon Pricing and Energy Taxation, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/11/effective-carbon-rates-2025_a578dc11/a5a5d71f-en.pdf, accessed 11 March 2026, p. 53.
[63] Id.
[64] Linking the China’s and EU ETS’s, p. 4.
[65] International Carbon Action Partnership, “Turkish Emission Trading System”, https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/ets/turkish-emission-trading-system, accessed 11 March 2026.
[66] Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (“Taxonomy Regulation”).
[67] Id., preamble para. 6.
[68] Id., art. 1.
[69] Id.
[70] Id., preamble para. 10-11, 13.
[71] Id., art. 18.
[72] Id., preamble para. 23, art. 9.
[73] Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims COM (2023) 166 final 2023/0085(COD).
[74] Tappr, “EU Green Claims Directive: Latest Guide”, 1 July 2025, https://www.usetappr.com/regulation/green-claims-directive#:~:text=Latest%20Update:%20Green%20Claims%20Directive,before%20this%20pause%20was%20announced, accessed 11 March 2026.
[75] Id.
[76] Nicolas J.S. Lockhart, Michele Tagliaferri, Anna-Shari Melin, Eva von Mühlenen, “Heightened Scrutiny of Green Claims in the European Union and Switzerland”, Sidley LLP, 3 April 2025, https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/publications/2025/03/heightened-scrutiny-of-green-claims-in-the-european-union-and-switzerland, accessed 11 March 2026.
[77] Greenpeace France and Others v. TotalEnergies SE and TotalEnergies Electricité et Gaz France, Paris Judicial Tribunal 34th Chamber Decision dated 23 October 2025.
[78] Id., para. 5, 8.
[79] Id., para. 46-48.
[80] Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main’s decision on climate neutral claims regarding detergents, Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main dated 2022, unofficial English summary https://www.climatecasechart.com/document/higher-regional-court-of-frankfurt-am-mains-decision-on-climate-neutral-claims-regarding-detergents_5803, accessed 11 March 2026.
[81] Id.
[82] Id.
[83] Id.
[84] Id.


