The global art market constitutes a significant economic sector worldwide, accounting for an estimated USD 57.5 billion of sales in 2024 with an ever-growing client base.[1]
Although the vital efforts of multi-disciplined professionals, including but not limited to accredited appraisers, auction houses’ in-house category specialists, provenance researchers, art historians, authentication boards, art foundations, physical and digital forensic experts as well as art market economic analysts, set a value range for a certain artwork depending on various factors, the final price paid by the buyer depends heavily on subjective, non-financial intangible factors such as prestige and wealth signalling desire.[2] Therefore, it is relatively easy to inflate the prices for the purchase of an artwork.[3] In addition, the art world traditionally relies on complex, opaque and confidential structures.[4] The identity of the parties, the ultimate beneficial owners, the purchase price of the artwork, particulars of the artwork itself and commission retained by the dealer and other intermediaries during an art transaction are among the elements that are kept confidential.[5] Thus, it can be difficult to detect the ultimate beneficial owners of a sale. For instance, recently, on 18 November 2025, Gustav Klimt’s Portrait of Elisabeth Lederer from Leonard A. Lauder’s stellar collection, set a historic record at the evening auction of Sotheby’s New York when it sold for USD 236.4 million, becoming the most expensive modern artwork ever sold at auction and the second-most expensive artwork sold at auction.[6] Although the sale attracted considerable attention, the identity of the buyer who acquired the painting at the end of a 20-minute auction challenge through a telephone bid has not been disclosed.[7] With sales being conducted through (in some cases multiple) intermediaries, it is theoretically possible to remain anonymous as the buyer, the seller, or, in some cases, both.[8]
The tradition of confidentiality, subjective aspects of the pricing, cash payment preferences along with the portability of artworks through voluminous international trade and other vulnerabilities of the art market render the sale of artworks prone to illicit activities such as money laundering and terrorism financing.[9] It is further suggested that new trends such as online sales where parties to a transaction do not physically meet, or crypto assets, such as non-fungible tokens, facilitating the transfer of ownership and concealability of virtual asset transactions increase the likelihood of illicit activities.[10]
This likelihood has led both to the issuance of non-binding recommendations for art market participants’ self-regulation and binding regulations.[11] It must also be emphasised that, although there have been certain sensational cases involving money laundering through art transactions,[12] many market participants such as galleries and auction houses adhere with the codes of ethics prepared by national judicial bodies and international institutions and have adamant internal procedures, such as know your client (“KYC”) and source of funds checks, that leave little room for such illicit practices.[13] In that respect, certain criticisms have also been raised against the regulations set out below, claiming that there is insufficient concrete and reliable evidence to establish a widespread money laundering practice in art transactions, and that much of the commentary by the media and law enforcement on the matter is largely speculative.[14]
This article provides a brief insight on the anti-money laundering (“AML”) policies in binding and soft law resources with a specific emphasis on the Turkish legal framework.[15]
I. Development of Anti-Money Laundering Regulations in the Art Market
The vulnerabilities of the art market for money laundering attracted the attention of academics and policymakers beginning from the end of the 20th century.[16] Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), which is an inter-governmental body found in 1989 and is based in Paris, sets the international standards that aim the prevention of global money laundering and terrorist financing activities.[17] First published in 1990, and regularly reviewed and updated in light of the development of new money laundering techniques and methods, FATF’s 40 Recommendations provide the legislative, institutional and policy framework for countries to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.[18]
In 2023, FATF published a targeted report that sets out the current state of relationship between the art market and money laundering, including a list of indicators that aids sector participants to identify suspicious activities in the art market and good practices.[19] Also through a self-regulation approach, Basel Institute on Governance has the non-binding Basel Art Trade Principles, which recommends a practical, risk-based approach based on a tripartite check relating to the identity of the client, provenance of the art object and the origin of the buyer’s funds involved in the transaction.[20]
Money laundering is a criminal offence in most jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions have taken specific preventative regulatory actions at national or supra-national levels to manage risks relating to money laundering.[21] European Union (“EU”) law resources in this matter substantially shaped the inclination toward global regulation.[22] In the EU’s 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the Directive’s ratione personae was expanded to include persons trading in goods that make or receive payments of EUR 10,000 or more.[23] That instrument did not specifically involve art market participants, but was a step for curbing voluminous cash transactions, which affected the art market. It was the EU’s 5th Directive which was enacted in 2018 and entered into force in 2020 that specifically underlined responsibilities of the art market participants in combating money laundering.[24]
The 5th Directive amended the Article 2 of the 4th Directive to specifically include “persons trading or acting as intermediaries in the trade of works of art, including when this is carried out by art galleries and auction houses, where the value of the transaction or a series of linked transactions amounts to EUR 10 000 or more”.[25] As such, key obligations such as enhanced customer due diligence on not only to new clients but also existing clients, identification and verification of the beneficial owner of a transaction, reporting of the suspicious transactions through internal procedures and maintaining detailed records for all transactions entered into the lives of the art traders.[26]
These detailed obligations which required concrete actions of the art market participants and supervision from national authorities triggered individual jurisdictions to work and research on the matter. For instance, the United Kingdom (“UK”) Government tasked the British Art Market Federation (“BAMF”) to issue a guidance document for application of the current British money laundering regulations in the art market.[27] BAMF’s “Guidance on Anti Money Laundering for UK Art Market Participants” was approved by UK Government’s Treasury Department, and serves as a detailed industry guideline in navigating AML obligations for art market participants.[28] The United Kingdom amended its Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (“2017 Regulations”) to transpose the EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive.[29] Similar to the EU regulations, the definition of “art market participant” was brought to the scope of the 2017 Regulations for traders who engage in (one or a series of) transactions that amount to EUR 10,000 or more.[30] The art market participants are required to register with His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) for regulatory supervision, oversight and enforcement, carry out a formal risk assessment at least once every year, appoint a nominated officer to ensure compliance, adapt written internal policies and procedures, train their employees, keep records relating to transactions, report sanctions and suspicious activities, and carry out extensive customer due diligence verifying the customer’s identity and source of funds.[31] Through these efforts, the United Kingdom became one of the first countries to concretize the European Union’s anti-money laundering regulation wave for the art market, despite Brexit.[32]
II. Turkish Legal Framework
A. Money Laundering Criminal Offence
Under Turkish Law, the act of money laundering is a criminal offence that is regulated in Article 282 titled Laundering of Proceeds of Crime, in Chapter Two titled Offences Against the Administration of Justice of Part Four titled Offences Against the Nation and the State and the Last Provisions of the Second Book titled Special Provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code. Accordingly, any person who transfers assets abroad that have been acquired as a result of an offence carrying a minimum sentence of six months’ imprisonment, or who subjects such assets to transactions to conceal their unlawful origin or to create the impression that such assets have been legitimately acquired, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of three to seven years and a judicial fine of up to twenty thousand days.[33]
B. MASAK Legislation
1. Overview
Besides criminal provisions, the main preventive and administrative regulation relating to anti-money laundering is the Law numbered 5549 on the Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime (“Law No 5549”) and its relevant secondary regulations.[34] The regulatory authority supervising the application of these regulations is the Turkish Financial Crimes Investigation Board (Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu, “MASAK”), operating as the financial intelligence unit of Türkiye under the Turkish Ministry of Finance and Treasury (the “Ministry”).[35] The secondary regulations to the Law No 5549 are the Regulation on Measures Regarding Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism, and General Communiqués of MASAK.[36] In order to raise awareness relating to the issue, MASAK publishes informative materials such as sectoral research reports, brochures and risk reports relating to each category of the obliged persons.[37]
2. Ratione Personae of MASAK Legislation
Law No 5549 explicitly states “those engaged in or mediating the trade of historical artifacts, artworks and antiques” among the obliged parties.[38] Article 4(1)(ö) of the Regulation on Measures Regarding Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism (“Regulation”) also states “those who deal in the buying and selling of historical artifacts, antiques and art works, and who act as auctioneers for these items”.[39] Therefore, the legal and natural person actors of the art market, such as auction houses, galleries, antiques traders are bound by this legislation. The ratione personae of this regulation does not have a minimum transaction limit such as the EUR 10,000 limit found in the regulations of the EU or the UK, provided that the main activity is trading.
3. Identity Verification and KYC Obligations
Before any transaction, art traders must conduct identity verification on the parties to the transaction and their agents acting on their behalf or account in accordance with KYC principles.[40] As a general rule, the obliged persons must conduct identity verification without regard to any monetary threshold for establishing a continuous business relationship or when there is doubt as to the adequacy and accuracy of the previously obtained customer information.[41] In addition, cases where the total amount of (one or more) transactions exceed the total of TRY 185,000 also requires identity verification.[42] The obliged parties also must take the necessary measures to determine the ultimate beneficial owner of the transaction.[43]
The obliged parties must pay special attention to complex and unusually large transactions or transactions that do not appear to have a reasonable legal and economic purpose, take the necessary measures to obtain sufficient information about the purpose of the requested transaction, and keep the information, documents and records obtained in this context for submission to the authorities upon request.[44] Similarly, transactions that are concluded with real and legal persons from high risk countries need such special attention.[45] Obliged parties must not establish or continue to business relationships in cases where they cannot verify identification or the reason of the business relationship.[46]
4. Reporting of Suspicious Transactions
Another fundamental obligation of the obliged parties is the reporting of suspicious transactions.[47] The Regulation defines a suspicious transaction as “any information, suspicion, or reason to suspect that the assets involved in a transaction conducted or attempted to be conducted by or through obliged parties have been illegally obtained, or used for illegal purposes, including terrorist acts or by terrorist organizations, terrorists, or those financing terrorism, or are related to or connected with them.”[48] These transactions must be reported to the MASAK Presidency regardless of the transaction amount.[49] MASAK General Communiqué No:13 further regulates the practical details of the suspicious transaction reporting.[50]
On 13 June 2025, MASAK issued suspicious transaction guidelines for certain categories of obliged persons for the first time and revised several of its existing guidance documents.[51] One of the newly introduced texts is a sector-specific guideline addressed to actors trading historical artifacts, antiques and artworks, as well as to auctioneers.[52] The guideline maps out key red flags specific to the sector, illustrates these risks through practical suspicious transaction scenarios, and provides hands-on guidance on how suspicious transaction reporting forms should be completed.[53] It also explains the use of the MASAK Online system for the electronic submission of suspicious transaction reports.[54] Suspicious transaction types are classified as those relating to the customer profile, sector-specific types, transactions carried out with persons suspected of having links to terrorist organisations or with high-risk countries, types relating to non-profit organisations, and types relating to the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[55] An undue urgency on the part of the client to conclude a transaction, or a lack of reasonable proportionality between the client’s job/profession, financial situation, and their transactions are examples of suspicious transaction types related to the customer profile.[56] Similarly, the client’s unwillingness to place their name on any document linking them with the auction item, or their use of false names; or their rapid resale of the auctioned item at the same or a lower price constitute sector-specific suspicious transaction types.[57]
5. Other Main Obligations of Obliged Parties
The obliged parties must continuously monitor the compliance and compatibility of transactions carried out by their clients, comply with MASAK Presidency and other audit authorities’ information and documentation requests, preserve and present to the authorities when necessary, all documents related to the obligations and transactions regulated with the legislation, and take precautions against technological risks.[58]
Article 5 of Law No 5549 provides that the Ministry, based on a risk-based approach, is authorized to regulate obliged parties to implement anti-money compliance measures, such as implementation of training, internal audit, control and risk management systems and appointment of an administrative-level officer to ensure compliance.[59] However, as of today, the Ministry has not imposed a compulsory regime for non-financial obliged parties including art market participants, and MASAK recommends these compliance measures as non-binding best practices.
6. Penalties
Law No 5549 foresees both criminal sanctions and administrative fines in cases of breaches of anti-money laundering obligations. In case of non-compliance with the core obligations of Law No 5549, such as failure to properly report suspicious activities or to comply with the provision of continuous information and documentation, criminal sanctions apply, namely imprisonment between one to three years and a judicial fine up to five thousand days.[60] In addition, those who act in their own name but on account of another person, in case failure to declare in writing to the obliged parties, are subject to punishment of imprisonment from six months to one year or a judicial fine of up to five thousand days.[61]
As for administrative fines, for the year 2025, administrative fines range from TRY 226,671 to TRY 7,555,806, for failure to carry out proper identity checks, provide continuous information and notify suspicious transactions.[62] Administrative fines cannot be imposed more than eight years after the date of the violation.[63]
C. Current State for AML Regulations for the Art Market in Türkiye
In its sectoral research report dated 2020, MASAK determined those engaged in the trade of historical artifacts, antiques and artworks constitute “one of the most problematic groups in terms of obligations”.[64] Nevertheless, it was noted with concern that no suspicious activity was ever received from this sectoral group.[65] Therefore, it is clear that the Turkish art market currently lacks a high level of awareness on this matter.
Similarly, in another sectoral research report dated 2021, money laundering risks specific to the sector were explained.[66] MASAK evaluated that increasing the obligated parties in this sector might be beneficial for raising awareness on the issue.[67]
Despite this state of the art market actors, Türkiye stays committed to reinforcing its policies and enforcement for combatting money laundering activities in accordance with FATF’s 40 Recommendations.[68] In that respect, Türkiye’s delisting from the FATF Grey List in 2024 and the comprehensive efforts of national bodies draw a promising general framework that will set a good example for the art sector.[69] Nevertheless, it is clear that the art market stakeholders must be more comprehensively informed about their current obligations and, even if not legally required, should create solutions with their internal procedures that will mitigate risks relating to money-laundering. MASAK might also impose stricter fines and more developed monitoring for art market participants’ violations of the applicable AML legislation. This way, Türkiye will prove itself to be the desired secure hub for cultural property and artwork transactions that will have a boosting impact on Turkish economy and culture.
—–
[1] Art Basel & UBS, “The Art Basel and UBS Art Market Report 2025”, 2025, https://www.artbasel.com/about/initiatives/the-art-market, accessed 20 November 2025, p.17; Deloitte, “Art & Finance Report 2025”, 2025, https://www2.deloitte.com/lu/en/pages/art-finance/articles/art-finance-report.html, accessed 20 November 2025, p. 27.
[2] Anne Laure Bandle, “Arbiters of Value: The Complexity and Dealers’ Liability in Pricing Art”, in: L’art a-t-il un prix ? L’évaluation des œuvres d’art, ses défis pratiques et juridiques, Gabus, Pierre & Bandle, Anne Laure (Ed.). Genève. Genève : Schulthess, 2014, pp. 29–76. (Etudes en droit de l’art) pp. 30, 34 ; Henry Peter, Paul-Benoît Duvoisin, “De la valeur et du prix des œuvres d’art” in: L’art a-t-il un prix ? L’évaluation des œuvres d’art, ses défis pratiques et juridiques, Gabus, Pierre & Bandle, Anne Laure (Ed.). Genève. Genève: Schulthess, 2014, pp.120, 122-142; Maxwell Rabb, “What Determines the Price of an Artwork?”, Artnet, 13 November 2025, https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-determines-price-artwork, accessed 15 November 2025. For an early record of values of the artworks and the subjective nature of valuation, see, in general, Pliny the Elder, Natural History, Book 35, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1952, pp. 79,115,161,169, https://ia801308.us.archive.org/3/items/cu31924031053550/cu31924031053550.pdf, accessed 3 December 2025: “Another most curious fact and worthy of record is, that the latest works of artists and the pictures left unfinished at their death are valued more than any of their finished paintings (…). The reason is that in these we see traces of the design and the original conception of the artists, while sorrow for the hand that perished at its work beguiles us into the bestowal of praise.”
[3] Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), “Tarihi Eser, Antika ve Sanat Eserleri Alım Satımı ile Uğraşanlar veya Bunların Müzayedeciliğini Yapanlar Sektör Araştırma Raporu”, 2021, https://ms.hmb.gov.tr/uploads/sites/12/2021/03/TARIHI-ESER-ANTIKA-SANAT-ESERLERI-ALIM-SATIMI-ile-UGRASANLAR-Guncellenmis-sektor-arastirma-raporu-2021-1.pdf, (“MASAK Raporu 2021”), accessed 2 December 2025; Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Art and Antiquities Market”, 2023, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Money-Laundering-Terrorist-Financing-Art-Antiquities-Market.pdf.coredownload.pdf (“FATF Report 2023”), accessed 1 December 2025, p. 8; Basel Institute on Governance, “Basel Art Trade Anti-Money Laundering Principles”, 2018, https://baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/Basel%20Art%20Trade%20AML%20Principles%202018.pdf, accessed 1 December 2025, (“Basel AML Principles”) p. 8.
[4] Martin Wilson, Art Law and the Business of Art, 2nd Edition, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022, (“Wilson”), pp.382, 385-386; Andrew Dornbierer, “Money Laundering and Sanctions Evasion Using the Art Market”, Basel Institute on Governance, Quick Guide Series, https://baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/230412-quickguide_29.pdf, accessed 10 December 2025 (“Dornbierer”).
[5] Ralph Lerner, Judith Bresler Art Law Volume I, 4th Edition, Practising Law Institution, 2013, p. 139; Wilson p. 382; See Accidia Foundation v. Simon C Dickinson Ltd [2010] EWHC 3058 (Ch) for a UK Chancery Division case where the court addressed issues relating to commission taken by the intermediary that was undisclosed to the seller as the actual purchase price was only known by the buyer and the intermediary.
[6] Sotheby’s, “Leonard A. Lauder Collector Evening Auction (2025)”, https://www.sothebys.com/en/buy/auction/2025/leonard-a-lauder-collector-evening-auction?locale=en&lotFilter=AllLots, accessed 19 November 2025; Daniel Cassady, “Gustav Klimt’s ‘Portrait of Elisabeth Lederer’ Sells for $236.4 M., Highest Price for Any Work of Modern Art Sold at Auction”, ARTnews, 18 November 2025, https://www.artnews.com/art-news/news/gustav-klimt-portrait-of-elisabeth-lederer-auction-record-1234762083/, accessed 29 November 2025.
[7] Rachel Muller-Heyndyk, “Klimt painting second-most expensive artwork sold at auction”, BBC, 19 November 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm2emm4737zo, accessed 10 December 2025.
[8] Wilson, p. 386; Dornbierer.
[9] Wilson, p. 382; Dornbierer; FATF Report 2023, pp.18-19; Basel AML Principles, p. 8; MASAK Raporu 2021, pp. 12-13.
[10] FATF Report 2023, pp. 3, 5, 11-14; Basel AML Principles, p. 8.
[11] Basel Art Trade Anti Money Laundering Principles issued by Basel Institute on Governance and the Responsible Art Market (RAM) Guidelines issued by the Responsible Art Market (RAM) initiative are examples to self-regulation instruments. See Enzo Bastian, “Fighting Money Laundering in the Art Market: A Comparative Overview of U.S. and Swiss Law”, Harvard International Law Journal Online, 18 March 2025, https://journals.law.harvard.edu/ilj/2025/03/fighting-money-laundering-in-the-art-market-a-comparative-overview-of-u-s-and-swiss-law/, accessed 10 December 2025 (“Bastian”).
[12] See FATF Report 2023 for case studies citing examples to such practices. See also Dornbierer for a brief analysis on Edemar Cid Ferreira case on how launderers can exploit the portability of artworks.
[13] CINOA, “Addressing Money Laundering in the Art Market: A Trade Perspective on Challenges and Regulatory Reform”, 25 January 2025, https://www.cinoa.org/advocacy/addressing-money-laundering-in-the-art-market-a-trade-perspective-on-challenges-and-regulatory-reform/, accessed 10 December 2025 (“CINOA”); Wilson, pp. 383-384. See FATF Report 2023, pp. 39-40 for examples such as Finnish Regional State Administrative Agency’s AML/CFT guidelines, British Art Market Federation’s guidance on anti-money laundering, French FIU Tracfin and French Customs’ joint AML/CFT guidance, UNESCO’s International Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property and International Council of Museums’ Code of Ethics for Museums and the initiatives of the Responsible Art Market (RAM) as good practices.
[14] CINOA; Wilson, p. 383.
[15] For a comparative study covering the anti-money laundering regulations by a set of questions relating to the applicable legislation in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States, see Center for Art Law, “Anti-Money Laundering Regulations and the Art Market”, 2nd Edition, last updated 10 October 2025 (“Center for Art Law AML Regulations”), accessed 11 October 2025.
[16] Bastian.
[17] Financial Action Task Force (FATF). “Who We Are”. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/the-fatf/who-we-are.html accessed 10 December 2025.
[18] FATF Report 2023, p. 8; MASAK Raporu 2021.
[19] FATF Report 2023.
[20] Basel AML Principles, p. 4.
[21] FATF Report 2023, pp. 17-18.
[22] Center for Art Law AML Regulations. See https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-international-level_en for an overview of EU’s efforts in anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing.
[23] Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, art. 2.1(e).
[24] Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing; Center for Art Law AML Regulations, p. 3.
[25] Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, art. 1(c)(i).
[26] Center for Art Law AML Regulations, p. 3.
[27] Wilson, p. 386.
[28] The British Art Market Federation (BAMF), “Guidance on Anti Money Laundering for UK Art Market Participants”, 6 February 2023, https://tbamf.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/BAMF-AML-Guidelines-February-6th-2023.pdf (“Guidance on Anti Money Laundering”) accessed 10 December 2025 ; Wilson, p. 386.
[29] Wilson, p. 384. It must be noted that apart from the 2017 Regulations, which foresee civil penalties in case of non-compliance, other relevant regulations in the UK are in force, such as the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Terrorism Act 2000, Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The criminal acts relating to money laundering and terrorism financing are subject to penalties that can extend to prison sentence.
[30] Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, art. 14(1)(d).
[31] Wilson, pp. 391-393; Guidance on Anti Money Laundering, pp. 5-6,10-11; Rakhi Talwar, United Kingdom, in Center for Art Law AML Regulations, pp. 214-221.
[32] Poppy Kemp, “Focusing on the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for the Art Market Participants in the UK”, 26 July 2022; Center for Art Law, https://itsartlaw.org/art-law/focusing-on-the-anti-money-laundering-regulations-for-the-art-market-participants-in-the-uk/ accessed 8 December 2025. See Wilson, pp. 382-415 for a detailed analysis of the British anti-money laundering and sanctions compliance regulations.
[33] Turkish Criminal Code, art. 282.
[34] See Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), Aklama Suçu Ulusal Mevzuat, https://masak.hmb.gov.tr/aklama-sucu-ulusal-mevzuat, accessed 15 December 2025, for all relevant legislative sources.
[35] Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Treasury and Finance, “Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK): Duties and Powers”, https://en.hmb.gov.tr/fcib-duties-powers, accessed 10 December 2025.
[36] Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), Aklama Suçu Ulusal Mevzuat, https://masak.hmb.gov.tr/aklama-sucu-ulusal-mevzuat, accessed 15 December 2025.
[37] Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), Rehberler, https://masak.hmb.gov.tr/aklama-sucu-ulusal-mevzuat, accessed 15 December 2025; Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), Broşürler, https://masak.hmb.gov.tr/brosurler, accessed 15 December 2025.
[38] Law No 5549, art. 2(1)(d).
[39] Regulation, art. 4(1)(ö).
[40] Law No 5549, art. 3(1); Regulation, arts. 5-17. The Regulation sets out specific detailed identification procedures for different categories of obliged persons, such as, natural persons, legal persons registered with the trade registry, associations and foundations, trade unions and confederations, political parties, foreign-resident legal persons and trusts established abroad, unincorporated organisations, public institutions, persons acting on behalf of another, persons acting on account of another. In addition, the Regulation also explains what type of identity proving documents for each category as well as instances where and how remote identification can be made.
[41] Regulation, arts. 5(1)(a)-(d).
[42] Id., art. 5(1)(b)-(c). This threshold is TRY 15,000 for crypto asset transfers provided by crypto asset service providers or electronic transfers.
[43] Id., art. 17/A. The same article provides guidelines on how to determine the beneficial owner. For instance, for the continuous business relationships with legal entities registered in the trade registry, the identities of natural or legal person shareholders that hold more than 25% of the shares must be identified. In case there is suspicious that a natural person holding more than 25% of the shares is not the ultimate beneficial owner or no such natural person exists, the obliged party must identify the natural person who ultimately control the legal entity. In cases where the beneficial owner cannot be identified through ownership or control, the natural person(s) holding the highest level of executive authority registered in the trade registry is deemed to be the ultimate beneficial owner in their capacity as senior managing officials. The same approach to treat senior managing officials as ultimate beneficial owners in case where control mechanism cannot be determined also applies to other legal entities and unincorporated organizations. Foreign resident legal entity shareholders can be verified through official or equivalent public sources.
[44] Id., arts. 18-19.
[45] Id., art. 25.
[46] Id., art. 22.
[47] Law No 5549, Article 4; Regulation, arts. 27-30.
[48] Regulation, art. 27(1).
[49] Law No 5549, art. 4(1); Regulation, art. 27(2).
[50] MASAK General Communiqué No:13.
[51] Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), “Şüpheli İşlem Bildirim Rehberleri ve MASAK Online 2.0 Sistemi Hakkında Duyuru”, https://masak.hmb.gov.tr/duyuru/supheli-islem-bildirim-rehberleri-ve-masak-online-2-0-sistemi-hakkinda-duyuru, accessed 10 December 2025.
[52] Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), “Şüpheli İşlem Bildirim Rehberi Tarihi Eser, Antika ve Sanat Eseri Alım Satımı ile Uğraşanlar veya Bunların Müzayedeciliğini Yapanlar”, Sürüm 1.0, 16 Haziran 2025, https://ms.hmb.gov.tr/uploads/sites/12/2025/06/SIB-REHBER-MUZAYEDE-1.0-d1630103b280dd3e.pdf, accessed 10 December 2025 (“MASAK Sanat Piyasası Şüpheli İşlem Bildirim Rehberi”).
[53] Id., pp. 6-17.
[54] Id., p .6.
[55] Id., pp.17-21.
[56] Id., p.18.
[57] Id., pp.19-20.
[58] Law No 5549, arts. 6-8; Regulation, arts. 19-20. The records and documents must be kept for a period of 8 years.
[59] Law No 5549, art. 5.
[60] Law No 5549, arts.14; 4(2), 7, 8.
[61] Law No 5549, art. 15.
[62] Law No 5549, arts. 3, 4, 13(6); MASAK Sanat Piyasası Şüpheli İşlem Bildirim Rehberi, p. 19. The text of Article 13 of Law No. 5549 indicates that failure to carry out proper identity checks and provide continuous information in accordance with Articles 3 and 6 have an administrative fine of TRY 30,000, and failure to notify suspicious transactions in accordance with Article 4 have an administrative fine of TRY 50,000. Furthermore, if an obliged party breaches its obligations under Article 5, which governs the obliged parties’ obligation to comply with the procedures and principles determined by the Ministry relating to the implementation of training, internal audit, control and risk management systems and appointment of an administrative-level officer to ensure compliance, the obliged parties are first issued a written warning and granted a thirty-day period to remedy the breach. If, at the end of this thirty-days period, non-compliance persists, an administrative fine of TRY 500,000 is imposed on the obligor. After the notification of the administrative fine, if non-compliance still continues, an additional period of no less than sixty days is granted. If the non-compliance is not remedied at the end of this period, an additional administrative fine equal to twice the amount of the first fine is imposed. If non-compliance still persists within thirty days following the notification of the second administrative fine, the matter is reported to the relevant authority for implementation of measures such as suspending or restricting the activities of the obliged party for a certain period, or cancelling their activity licence.
However, it must be noted that these administrative fine amounts are subject to annual reevaluation by the Ministry of Ministry of Treasure and Finance every year. For the year 2025, the amounts have been reevaluated in the ratio of 25.49% and published in the Official Gazette dated 27 November 2025 and numbered 33090. See Revenue Administration of Türkiye (GİB), “General Communiqué on the Tax Procedure Law No. 585 Published in the Official Gazette”, 27 November 2025, https://www.gib.gov.tr/duyuru-arsivi/guncel/15258_vergi_usul_kanunu_genel_tebligi_sira_no:_585_resmi_gazetede_yayimlandi, accesd10 December 2025; Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), “Yaptırımlar”, https://masak.hmb.gov.tr/yaptirimlar, accessed 24 December 2025.
[63] Law No 5549, art. 13(6); MASAK Sanat Piyasası Şüpheli İşlem Bildirim Rehberi, p. 19.
[64] Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), “Tarihi Eser, Antika ve Sanat Eserleri Alım Satımı ile Uğraşanlar Sektör Araştırma Raporu 2020”, 2020, https://ms.hmb.gov.tr/uploads/2020/12/TARIHI-ESER-ANTIKA-SANAT-ESERLERI-ALIM-SATIMI-ile-UGRASANLAR-Sektor-arastirma-raporu-2020.pdf#:~:text=denetimi%20olan%20bir%20mevzuat%20bulunmaktad%C4%B1r,ilgili%20mevzuat%20a%C3%A7%C4%B1s%C4%B1ndan%20bak%C4%B1ld%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1nda%3B%20sekt%C3%B6rde, accessed 10 December 2025, (“MASAK Raporu 2020”), pp. 20-21. For an earlier report relating to the fundamental principles relating to traders of historical artifacts, antiques and artworks, see Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), “Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasının ve Terörizmin Finansmanının Önlenmesine Dair Yükümlülüklere İlişkin Temel Esaslar”, 2015, https://ms.hmb.gov.tr/uploads/sites/12/2021/02/Antika-Muzayede-Brosur.pdf, accessed 17 December 2025.
[65] MASAK Raporu 2020, pp. 20-21.
[66] MASAK Raporu 2021, pp.12-13.
[67] Id., p. 24.
[68] Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK), “Türkiye’de Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanması ve Terörizm Finansmanı ile Mücadele ve Müsadere Uygulamalarında Etkinliğin Artrılması Strateji Belgesi 2021-2025“, https://ms.hmb.gov.tr/uploads/sites/12/2024/07/USB_REVIZE_METIN.pdf accessed 18 December 2025.
[69] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hazine ve Maliye Bakanlığı, “Türkiye’nin Gri Listeden Çıkarılmasına İlişkin Basın Açıklaması”, 28 June 2024, https://www.hmb.gov.tr/haberler/turkiyenin-gri-listeden-cikarilmasina-iliskin-basin-aciklamasi-28-haziran-2024#:~:text=ve%20Maliye%20Bakanl%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1-,T%C3%BCrkiye’nin%20Gri%20Listeden%20%C3%87%C4%B1kar%C4%B1lmas%C4%B1na,Bas%C4%B1n%20A%C3%A7%C4%B1klamas%C4%B1%20(%2028%20Haziran%202024)&text=Mali%20Eylem%20G%C3%B6rev%20G%C3%BCc%C3%BC’n%C3%BCn,sayesinde%20T%C3%BCrkiye%20gri%20listeden%20%C3%A7%C4%B1kar%C4%B1lm%C4%B1%C5%9Ft%C4%B1r, accessed 24 December 2025.
