The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) delivered its judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing SA v. FIFA, UEFA and URBSFA on 1 August 2025.[1] The significance of the ruling lies in the CJEU’s conclusion that awards rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) do not automatically produce a res judicata effect within the European Union (“EU”). Instead, EU courts must have the ability to review such awards for their compatibility with EU public policy.
Although the underlying dispute arose in a sports law context, and specifically concerned the mandatory nature of CAS jurisdiction, the judgment may reflect a broader tendency in the CJEU’s approach to arbitration.
I. Background of the Dispute
A Belgian football club, RFC Seraing, entered into a contract with a sports investment company, Doyen Sports Investment Ltd (“Doyen”), in 2015. The agreement envisaged future financing arrangements and transferred 30 percent of the economic rights of three players to Doyen. In return, Doyen paid EUR 300,000 and RFC Seraing agreed not to dispose of the remaining share of those rights to any third party. A similar agreement followed shortly after, under which 25 percent of another player’s economic rights were transferred to Doyen in exchange for EUR 50,000.[2]
After an investigation by FIFA and the Belgian football authorities, the club was sanctioned with a four-window transfer ban and a fine of 150,000 Swiss francs.[3] The authorities considered that both agreements violated Articles 18bis and 18ter of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP”), which prohibit any third-party influence over clubs’ employment or transfer decisions and ban third-party ownership of economic rights arising from future transfers.[4]
RFC Seraing brought the decision before the FIFA Appeal Committee and, following dismissal, proceeded to the CAS, which is the mandatory appeal route under FIFA rules.[5] Before the CAS, the club argued that the prohibitions in Articles 18bis and 18ter infringed Articles 45, 56, 63, 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), namely the freedom of movement for workers, free movement of services, free movement of capital and the competition rules, as well as Swiss competition law. In March 2017, the CAS upheld the FIFA decision, reducing only the duration of the transfer ban.[6] RFC Seraing brought an annulment action before the Swiss Supreme Court, which dismissed the claims in February 2018.[7]
Meanwhile, before FIFA initiated its disciplinary proceedings, Doyen and RFC Sérésien (the controlling entity of RFC Seraing) had already brought proceedings before the Brussels courts against FIFA, UEFA and the Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL (“URBSFA”), claiming that Articles 18bis and 18ter were incompatible with EU law.[8] After disciplinary proceedings commenced, RFC Seraing intervened as well. The court of first instance declined jurisdiction, and the matter was appealed before the Brussels Court of Appeal.
On appeal, the Brussels Court of Appeal held that the CAS award between the same parties had to be regarded as having the force of res judicata and, moreover, that even though the URBSFA had not been a party to the CAS proceedings, the CAS award still carried probative value for the Belgian association.[9]
II. Preliminary Ruling Request
RFC Seraing appealed the decision of the Court of Appeal before the Court of Cassation of Belgium. Since the case required the interpretation of EU law, the Court of Cassation referred two questions to the CJEU.[10] In short, the questions were as follows:
- Whether EU law limits national courts’ ability to treat an arbitral award as final when the award’s compatibility with EU law was examined only by a non-EU court.
- Whether EU law limits the possibility for national law to give such an award evidentiary force against third parties when its EU-law compliance was reviewed solely by a non-EU court.
III. The CJEU’s Judgment
The CJEU started its analysis by underlying the right to effective judicial protection.[11] It stressed that parties may conclude agreements referring their disputes to arbitration.[12] However, it also noted that if the arbitration mechanism is to be implemented in the EU, then it must be compatible with the EU legal principles and the EU public policy.[13] Therefore, according to the CJEU, in order for the Article 47 of the EU Charter[14] to be respected, the awards must be “amenable” to judicial review.[15] At this point, by reference to Eco Swiss and Mostaza Claro, the CJEU stated that such a judicial review should be limited in nature.[16]
Then, the CJEU made a distinction between voluntary arbitration and mandatory arbitration,[17] as suggested in the Attorney General’s opinion.[18] It stressed that in sports, arbitration is often imposed unilaterally by federations or associations which have regulatory or oversight powers. According to the CJEU, while such an obligation may serve legitimate objectives, including consistent interpretation and application of sporting rules, legal autonomy cannot deprive individuals of rights guaranteed under EU law.[19]
In fact, individuals who wish to participate in sports competitions professionally have little real choice but to accept CAS jurisdiction. In the case of FIFA, for instance, Articles 47(3) and 50(1) of the FIFA Statutes require that disciplinary decisions be appealed before the CAS.[20] For this reason, the CJEU stated that such a mandatory system requires appropriate safeguards to ensure that individuals have access to a court capable of examining whether the award complies with EU public policy.[21] The CJEU underlined that individuals must be able to bring such questions before a court or tribunal of a member state, either directly or indirectly, that can examine the award.[22] Additionally, beyond examining the award, the EU courts must also be able to draw “all the appropriate legal conclusions where such an inconsistency is found to exist” for the sake of effectiveness of the judicial review.[23]
As a result, the CJEU concluded that CAS awards cannot be treated as having res judicata effect or probative value without being determined by an EU court that it is compatible with EU law and thus the EU public policy.
IV. Importance of the Judgment
In essence, while the CJEU recognized the institutional value of CAS arbitration in promoting coherence within sports governance, it unequivocally affirmed that EU public policy prevails whenever a conflict arises. Consequently, for CAS awards to benefit from res judicata effect, they must be subject to “effective” judicial scrutiny on a case-by-case basis regarding their compliance with EU public policy.
Notably, compared to the Advocate General’s Opinion, which advocated for a full review of CAS awards and suggested that the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) should not apply to them,[24] the CJEU adopted a more measured approach. By limiting the scope of “effective review” to EU public policy and maintaining the reference to the New York Convention, the CJEU arguably provided slightly more breathing room for sports arbitration. Furthermore, the explicit distinction made by the CJEU between mandatory and voluntary arbitration signals that voluntary arbitration may remain relatively insulated from such strict intervention.
The issue with CAS awards is that, since the seat of each CAS tribunal is by default in Lausanne,[25] the competent jurisdiction for the set aside proceedings is Switzerland, and more specifically, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court is competent as per Article 191 of the Swiss Private International Law Act.[26] As Switzerland is not an EU Member State, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court cannot be expected, nor is it empowered, to conduct a review of EU law equivalent to that of a Member State court.[27] Besides, although CAS awards are also subject to the mechanisms provided under the New York Convention, the fact that one party is typically a regulatory or supervisory body capable of enforcing awards internally through the threat of disciplinary sanctions means that such organizations often enforce the awards internally, without the need of a formal enforcement process.[28]
Consequently, the probability of a CAS award reaching an EU court is significantly lower than that of an ordinary commercial arbitration award involving EU parties. Addressing this procedural gap, the CJEU clarified that direct recourse (such as by virtue of set aside or enforcement proceedings) is not required for a public policy review; parties may instead request such a review indirectly (in the CJEU’s words “in any manner whatsoever”) through EU courts.[29] Thus, irrespective of whether formal enforcement proceedings are initiated within the EU, the compatibility of a CAS award with EU public policy remains reviewable.
Given that CAS arbitration is frequently mandatory for professionals wishing to participate in major sporting events, this stance undoubtedly introduces stronger safeguards for athletes, clubs, and other stakeholders. However, the precise contours of an “effective review” remain somewhat nebulous. If EU national courts apply the principles set out in this judgment divergently, the aspiration for “coherence” in global sports justice may be undermined. Nevertheless, referring to its prior case law, the CJEU implicitly confirmed that an effective review does not equate to a full review of the merits. Conversely, if this judgment prompts a wave of challenges against CAS awards before EU courts, it could be argued that the CJEU has, at least in the short term, generated more uncertainty than legal certainty. It remains crucial, therefore, to ensure that EU judicial oversight does not become so overarching as to paralyze the sports arbitration system.
As a final remark, the CJEU made a distinction between mandatory and voluntary arbitration in its judgment. This being the case, since the EU public policy is an evolving concept and the fact that some of the reasonings mentioned above may, from time to time, be applicable or required for the commercial arbitration, this judgment may also be viewed as the latest step of a trajectory that began with Nordsee[30] and later developed through Eco Swiss, Mostaza Claro, Achmea,[31] Komstroy[32] and ISU[33]. Across these cases, the CJEU has consistently treated arbitration as operating largely outside the EU judicial architecture. Although the disputes involved different types of proceedings, ranging from voluntary commercial arbitration to compulsory sports arbitration and investor state dispute settlement mechanisms, the CJEU has either limited access to the preliminary reference procedure, relied on public policy review before national courts, or otherwise refrained from integrating arbitral awards into the EU’s legal system without EU courts acting as gatekeepers first. Seraing continues this approach while refining the contours of such review. The common point of all these judgments reflects EU’s understanding that the legal autonomy of the EU is superior. Therefore, the belief that the private arbitrators are persons “who cannot properly apply EU law, in the absence of the indispensable judicial dialogue with the Court of Justice”,[34] coupled with several other factors such as the evolving nature of the EU public policy, may eventually entail further adverse consequences for commercial arbitration within the EU. For the time being, however, the direct impact appears confined to the realm of sports arbitration.
Post-judgment commentary varies widely, ranging from optimism to pessimism regarding the future of sports dispute resolution.[35] Ultimately, the true impact of Seraing remains to be seen as national courts begin to apply this standard in the coming months and years.
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[1] The Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C‑600/23, Judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing SA v. FIFA, UEFA and URBSFA, ECLI:EU:C:2025:617 (“CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA”).
[2] Id., paras. 22-24; RFC Seraing v. Federation Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), CAS Arbitration Case No. 2016/A/4490, Award dated 9 March 2017 (“CAS, Seraing v. FIFA”), https://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/Shared%20Documents/4490.pdf, accessed 9 December 2025, paras. 4-13.
[3] CAS, Seraing v. FIFA, paras. 24-33; CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA, paras. 25-26.
[4] CAS, Seraing v. FIFA, paras. 14-23.
[5] Id., paras. 34-39; CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA, paras. 27-30.
[6] CAS, Seraing v. FIFA, p. 46.
[7] Id., paras. 31-42; Swiss Supreme Court Case numbered 4A_260/2017, Judgment of 20 February 2018, BGE 144 III 120, p. 135.
[8] CAS, Seraing v. FIFA, paras. 43-50.
[9] Id., paras. 49-50.
[10] See, the Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C-600/23, Summary of the Request for a Preliminary Ruling under Article 98(1) of the Rules of Procedures of the Court of Justice, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=280548&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11481731, accessed 28 November 2025.
[11] CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA, para 69.
[12] Id., para. 81. See also, the Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C-124/21, Judgment of 21 December 2023, International Skating Union v Commission, para. 193.
[13] CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA, para. 82.
[14] Article 47: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.
Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.”
[15] CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA, para. 83.
[16] Id., para. 84. See also, the Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C-126/97, Judgment of 1 June 1999, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV., para. 35; the Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C-168/05, Judgment of 26 October 2006, Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL., para. 34.
[17] CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA, paras. 79-80, 93, 97.
[18] The Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C-600/23, Opinion of the Advocate General Capeta delivered on 16 January 2025 (“AG Opinion”), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=294268&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12552353, accessed 28 November 2025, paras., 40, 55, 70-75.
[19] CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA, paras. 94-95. See also, the Court of Justice of the European Union numbered C-333/21, Judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, para. 75; the Court of Justice of the European Union numbered C-124/21, Judgment of 21 December 2023, International Skating Union v Commission, para. 196.
[20] Article 47(3): “Decisions pronounced by the Appeal Committee shall be irrevocable and binding on all the parties concerned. This provision is subject to appeals lodged with CAS.”; Article 50(1): “Appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA and its bodies shall be lodged with CAS within 21 days of receipt of the decision in question.”
[21] CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA, paras. 95-105.
[22] Id., paras. 76, 100, 108, 121.
[23] Id., para. 103.
[24] AG Opinion, paras. 116-122, 133-134.
[25] Court of Arbitration for Sport, Code of Sports-related Arbitration, Procedural Rules, https://www.tas-cas.org/en/arbitration/code-procedural-rules, accessed 18 December 2025, Rule 28.
[26] Antonio Rigozzi, “Challenging Awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport”, Journal of International Disputes Settlement, Vol.1, 2010, p. 220.
[27] Id., p. 252.
[28] Antonio Rigozzi, Sébastien Besson, William McAuliffe, “International Sports Arbitration”, GAR The European Arbitration Review, 2018, p. 7.
[29] CJEU, Seraing v. FIFA, para. 115.
[30] The Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C-102/81, Judgment of 23 March 1982, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG and Reederei Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG., para. 10.
[31] The Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C-284/16, Judgment of 6 March 2018, Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV; Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Burkhard Hess, “The Fate of Investment Dispute Resolution after the Achmea Decision of the European Court of Justice”, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law Research Paper Series No. 2018(3), pp. 5, 9.
[32] The Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C-741/19, Judgment of 2 September 2021, Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC; Jed Odermatt, “Is EU Law International? Case C-741/19 Republic of Moldova v. Komstroy LLC and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order”, European Papers, Vol.6, No.3, 2021.
[33] The Court of Justice of the European Union Case numbered C-124/21, Judgment of 21 December 2023, International Skating Union v European Commission.
[34] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Protection of intra-EU investment COM(2018) 547, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52018DC0547, accessed 28 November 2025.
[35] Susannah Moody, “CJEU says CAS awards must receive “effective” public policy review”, 01 August 2025, Global Arbitration Review, https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/cjeu-says-cas-awards-must-receive-effective-public-policy-review, accessed 28 November 2025.
