I. Introduction
Today, nearly 3,000 bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) exist between states.[1] When negotiating them, states generally start with draft texts prepared in advance[2] that reflect their investment policies[3] and their approach to developments in international investment law jurisprudence.[4] These drafts are known as model BITs.
One of the principal factors determining the extent to which a model BIT is reflected in the final treaty is the imbalance in the parties’ bargaining power.[5] Historically, the first model BITs were drafted by capital-exporting states, which held a relatively strong negotiating position.[6] Over time, developing states began preparing their own models as well.[7]
Some states, including the United States,[8] Canada[9] and Colombia,[10] officially publish their model BITs, while others, such as Switzerland[11] and Türkiye,[12] do not. The main obstacle to studying Türkiye’s model BITs is therefore access to their texts.
Although Türkiye does not officially publish its model BITs, the texts of its 2000 and May 2009 models are available on the website of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”).[13] Various sources and the treaties Türkiye has signed indicate that other models were used at different times.[14]
Accordingly, to obtain the other models, we submitted an information request to the Ministry of Industry and Technology through the Presidency’s Communication Centre (CİMER). The Ministry’s reply of 28 July 2026 provided six additional model BIT texts, dated 2004, 2005, 2006, March 2009,[15] January 2010 and January 2014.[16]
We have thus been able to examine together the full texts of eight models from 2000 to 2014. To our knowledge, no previous study in the literature on Türkiye’s BITs has drawn on as many model BIT texts.
For later models whose texts we could not obtain, we drew on treaties described in the reports of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye’s Foreign Affairs Committee as having been prepared on the basis of Türkiye’s model. We also drew inferences from provisions repeated in identical or substantially identical wording across treaties Türkiye concluded with different states.
The study’s main purpose is to compare the eight accessible models and selected signed treaties to trace continuity and change in Türkiye’s model BIT practice. The analysis points to a development in which traditional investor protections are retained while the scope of protection, the protection standards and the conditions of access to arbitration are defined in increasing detail over time.
We separately assess the significance of these changes for Türkiye’s investment policy and the interpretation of treaty provisions, distinguishing changes that can be identified directly from the texts from inferences about their source, purpose and effect.
We examine the development of Türkiye’s model BIT practice across three periods: the traditional protection framework of the 2000 model; the progressive elaboration of scope, standards and access to arbitration between 2005 and 2014; and common changes to provisions observed in selected treaties after 2014.
II. Overview of Türkiye’s Model BITs
The eight models dated 2000–2014 retain the traditional BIT structure in many respects. All provide for fair and equitable treatment (“FET”),[17] full protection and security (“FPS”),[18] national treatment (“NT”)[19] and most-favoured-nation (“MFN”) treatment,[20] compensation for expropriation,[21] free transfer of funds[22] and the insurer’s subrogation to the investor’s rights,[23] among other protections and ancillary provisions. For investor–state disputes, they offer only arbitration under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)[24] and ad hoc arbitration under the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).[25] None of the models contains an umbrella clause that turns a state’s obligations concerning investments into BIT obligations. Indeed, Türkiye’s BITs containing an umbrella clause were predominantly concluded with capital-exporting states possessing greater bargaining power, generally at earlier dates.[26]
Within this common framework, the provisions that change concern who and which investments benefit from protection, the content of substantive standards, and the conditions for resorting to arbitration. Some provisions incorporate an existing limitation developed in the case law into the treaty; others reduce ambiguity or introduce a new condition. The incorporation of Türkiye’s ICSID notification into the 2006 draft illustrates an effort to give effect to an existing position at treaty level.[27]
The comparison must distinguish a textual narrowing of a provision, clarification of its interpretation and a reduction of protection in practice. The first two can be traced through differences between drafts; the third requires further examination of the relevant treaty’s wording and its application in actual disputes. The chronological analysis below follows this distinction.
III. The 2000 Model BIT and the 2004–2006 Revisions
The 2000 model is an older-generation BIT draft reflecting the traditional approach to investor protection. Its text focuses solely on the protection of investments. Unlike newer-generation BITs, its preamble does not refer to social or environmental policy objectives, and the text contains neither a general exceptions provision preserving the right to regulate nor a stipulation that public welfare measures do not amount to indirect expropriation.
Investment is defined in broad, asset-based terms: movable and immovable property, company shares, claims to money related to an investment, intellectual property rights and concessions relating to natural resources qualify as investments, provided they comply with the host state’s law.[28] The final sentence of the definition, stating that the term investment refers to “all direct investments”, allows a reading that excludes portfolio investments.[29] For investors, nationality suffices for natural persons, and incorporation and headquarters for legal persons; there is no requirement of “substantial business activities” in the state of incorporation, as in later texts.[30]
Generally, an MFN clause enables a beneficiary, subject to the treaty’s conditions of comparison, to claim more favourable treatment accorded to investments and/or investors of third states. The 2000 model does not specify whether the clause extends to procedural provisions. This is unsurprising for its time: the January 2000 decision in Maffezini v. Spain was the first to accept that an MFN clause could extend to more favourable dispute settlement provisions.[31] The express procedural exceptions in later models may be read as a response to the interpretative possibility raised by that decision.[32]
The 2000 model also provides a simple framework for dispute settlement. If a dispute remains unresolved during the six-month period for amicable negotiations (the “cooling-off period”), the investor may turn to ICSID arbitration or ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules.[33] The model does not provide for proceedings before domestic courts or a fork-in-the-road rule making the chosen forum final for the same dispute. Nor does it exclude from arbitration disputes arising from investment activities that have not yet effectively commenced.
The core of the 2000 model remained in place, subject to limited changes, through 2006. The 2004 draft mainly updated terminology.[34] The 2005 draft marked a more significant step: it removed the sentence in the investment definition covering investments made before and after entry into force, added a separate “Scope of Application” article, and stated that the treaty did not apply to disputes arising before its entry into force.[35] The first significant change to the models thus concerned the treaty’s temporal scope rather than substantive standards (whether this wording narrowed the earlier scope or clarified an existing temporal limit is a separate interpretative question).
The 2006 draft brought a more extensive change. It elaborated the exceptions to treatment arising from tax treaties and economic integration agreements.[36] It also added a three-part paragraph to the investor–state dispute settlement article.[37] According to that paragraph, (a) only disputes arising from investment activities that have obtained any required permission and have effectively commenced may be submitted to international arbitration; (b) disputes concerning ownership of immovable property and rights in rem fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of Turkish courts; and (c) Türkiye will not consent to the referral to the International Court of Justice, under Article 64 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”), of inter-state disputes concerning the interpretation or application of that Convention that cannot be settled through negotiation.
The first two limitations reflect the notification Türkiye made under Article 25(4) when it became a party to the ICSID Convention in 1989.[38] In PSEG v. Türkiye, the first investment arbitration brought against Türkiye, the tribunal held that this notification was not a reservation and could not, by itself, limit consent to arbitration where the relevant BIT contained no such limitation (excluding disputes concerning investments that had not effectively commenced).[39] The notification’s later incorporation into the model BIT can be read as a response to the consent issue identified in that decision.[40] In this sense, the 2006 addition may be viewed as an effort to give effect to a position maintained since 1989, rather than a new policy.
The two limitations in Türkiye’s ICSID notification also appeared in different forms in BITs signed after PSEG.[41] First, the protocol to the BIT signed with France on 15 June 2006 expressly refers to Türkiye’s ICSID notification and restates its two limitations.[42] Next, the investor–state dispute settlement article of the BIT signed with Saudi Arabia on 8 August 2006 makes the states’ ICSID notifications an integral part of the treaty without setting out the limitations directly.[43] A third formulation first appears in the BIT signed with Oman on 4 February 2007.[44] This approach incorporates the limitations directly into the treaty text without referring to the ICSID notification. It is the approach adopted in Türkiye’s model BITs.
IV. The 2009 Model BIT and the 2010 Revision
A. Substantive Standards and the Scope of Protection
The 2009 model contains more substantial changes. Investor protection remains strong. The traditional protection approach is, however, placed within a framework that also refers to the state’s regulatory authority and public policy space in light of developing case law.
The first indication is in the preamble: it affirms that the objectives of protection can be achieved “without relaxing health, safety and environmental measures of general application as well as internationally recognized labor rights”. The concrete expression is the article entitled “Right to Regulate”: it recognises that the state may adopt non-discriminatory measures to protect life, health, the environment and natural resources,[45] measures it considers necessary for its essential security interests, and measures required to fulfil its obligations under the United Nations Charter.[46] A new paragraph in the article entitled “Expropriation and Compensation” also expressly provides that non-discriminatory legal measures designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives do not constitute indirect expropriation.[47] These changes can be read as reflecting the police powers doctrine, which recognises the state’s authority to regulate in the public interest and was emerging in arbitral case law.[48]
Indeed, the 2009 draft was prepared during the period in which this doctrine gained prominence in arbitral case law. The decisions in Methanex v. United States (2005) and Saluka v. Czech Republic (2006) accepted that non-discriminatory regulations serving the public interest generally do not constitute expropriation requiring compensation.[49] Methanex expressed this approach subject to due process and the absence of a specific contrary commitment to the investor, while Saluka emphasised good-faith regulation. The United States’ and Canada’s 2004 models had also included the principle in their annexes, subject to an “exceptional circumstances” qualification.[50] The indirect-expropriation paragraph in Türkiye’s 2009 draft follows this formula almost verbatim, but without the “exceptional circumstances” qualification.[51]
The 2009 models also elaborate the definitions of investment and investor. The general reference to “direct investment” in earlier models is removed from the investment definition. The definition instead refers to assets “connected with business activities” and acquired “for the purpose of establishing lasting economic relations”; it excludes shares or voting power acquired through stock exchanges representing less than ten per cent of a company’s capital or voting rights.[52] For corporate investors, the incorporation requirement remains, but “registered offices” replaces “headquarters”. The March 2009 draft adds a requirement of “real economic activities”,[53] replaced by “substantial business activities” in the May 2009 draft.[54]
The armed-conflict clause in Article IV(3), entitled “Expropriation and Compensation”, of the 2006 model is placed in a separate Article 6 entitled “Compensation for Losses” in the 2009 model, without any change to its substantive content.
Another innovation is the MFN limitation, which we believe was developed with the Maffezini line of case law in mind. The March 2009 draft does not yet contain it. The May 2009 draft published by UNCTAD provides that the MFN clause does not apply to “procedural rights”, seeking to prevent investors from importing more favourable dispute settlement provisions from another BIT.[55] Because the exception addresses procedural rights alone, it may also support the interpretation that importing substantive protections was assumed to remain within the clause’s scope.[56]
For dispute settlement, the 2009 models add the host state’s courts to the ICSID and UNCITRAL options—even if this arguably states the obvious—and introduce a fork-in-the-road rule under which the chosen forum is final.[57] The wording reflecting the ICSID notification, introduced in the 2006 draft, is retained.[58]
The May 2009 model was revised again in January 2010. This version for the first time ties FET and FPS to the “international law minimum standard of treatment”.[59] That standard denotes the international minimum level of protection owed to foreign investments. Although the formula might appear to be a feature of post-2016 treaties, it dates to 2010 and appears in signed treaties from 2011 among the texts examined.[60] The heading “Right to Regulate” became “General Exceptions”;[61] the MFN exception was clarified from “procedural rights” to “dispute settlement provisions”.[62] The phrase expressly excluding compensation in cases of indirect expropriation was removed,[63] the interest measure for delayed expropriation compensation was changed,[64] and a possibility of temporarily restricting transfers in the event of serious balance-of-payments difficulties was added.[65]
Tying FET and FPS to the minimum standard of treatment is a striking choice for a capital-exporting state signing treaties based on these models with states seeking its investment. It ties FET—the most flexible standard available to Turkish investors abroad—to a threshold whose content remains contested among tribunals. At the same time, because evolutionary interpretations of the minimum standard have brought it closer to FET protection not expressly tied to that standard, the change may be regarded primarily as an alignment with contemporary trends, with limited practical effect.
The choice does indeed reflect the trend of the period. The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) Free Trade Commission’s 2001 interpretation clarified that FET and FPS do not require treatment in addition to or beyond the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens;[66] the 2004 United States and Canadian models[67] and the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”)[68] incorporated this formula. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (“ASEAN”) 2009 Comprehensive Investment Agreement took a different approach: instead of tying the standard to customary law, it defined FET by reference to the prohibition of denial of justice in accordance with due process and FPS by reference to the adoption of reasonably necessary measures.[69] When Türkiye’s January 2010 text was prepared, although the tribunal in Glamis Gold v. United States (2009) required a high threshold for breach of the minimum standard,[70] the line of decisions in Mondev v. United States (2002)[71] and Waste Management II v. Mexico (2004)[72] had accepted that the standard was not frozen at the threshold of the 1920s Neer decision[73] but evolved with contemporary state practice. The continuation of the evolutionary approach in Railroad Development Corporation v. Guatemala (2012) supports our assessment above that the change had “limited practical effect”.[74]
B. The Relationship Between Domestic Courts and Arbitration
The 2009 model’s express provision for domestic courts as an option constitutes another change. In some treaties signed by Türkiye from the 1990s onward, the relationship between recourse to domestic courts and their failure to render a final decision within one year is expressed through the formula “provided that, if … and …”.[75] This complicated wording and its layered conditions lend themselves to two readings. Under one, an investor must first bring the dispute before domestic courts and those courts must have failed to issue a final decision within a year before the investor may resort to arbitration. Under the other, recourse to domestic courts is an option for the investor, and the one-year condition arises only if that option is exercised. The text thus left uncertain whether recourse to domestic courts was genuinely a precondition to arbitration or merely an available option.[76]
This ambiguity arose in practice in Rumeli v. Kazakhstan. In its decision of 29 July 2008, the tribunal, relying on the English and Russian texts of the treaty containing the same formula, did not treat prior recourse to domestic courts as mandatory.[77]
The issue later became more pronounced in cases brought against Turkmenistan under an older BIT. Tribunals in arbitrations brought by Turkish contractors under the same BIT interpreted the same article differently and reached different conclusions.
In its decision of 7 May 2012, the Kılıç v. Turkmenistan tribunal assessed the ambiguity in the English text alongside the Russian text and the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion, and held that recourse to domestic courts was mandatory. In its final award of 2 July 2013, a majority of the tribunal characterised the requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the claim.[78]
The Muhammet Çap & Sehil v. Turkmenistan tribunal, by contrast, read recourse to domestic courts after the six-month negotiation period as merely an option; the one-year period and the absence of a decision would matter only if that option were exercised.[79]
The majority in İçkale v. Turkmenistan considered recourse to domestic courts mandatory, but treated the question as one of admissibility rather than jurisdiction. Given that the matters underlying the dispute had already been brought before domestic courts by Turkmen public entities or the prosecutor’s office, the tribunal considered it inappropriate to require the investor to file a fresh action and found the claims admissible.[80]
In the 2009 model, by contrast, proceedings before domestic courts are expressly provided as an alternative to international arbitration and are subject to a fork-in-the-road rule. The uncertainty arising from the “provided that, if … and …” formula, which also does not appear in the earlier models, therefore does not arise under the 2009 and subsequent model texts. Although this clear provision in the later model may be invoked in support of the view that recourse to domestic courts was merely an option under older treaties as well, it cannot by itself resolve the interpretative issue.
C. The Changes and the Need to Protect Turkish Investors
From the 2009 model onward, Türkiye’s approach in the models used to conclude treaties with states receiving Turkish capital may be seen as somewhat at odds with its diplomatic position in those negotiations. Compared with the 2000 model, the 2009–2010 texts appear, at least at first sight, to give greater consideration to the host state. Even if the changes might have only a limited effect in practice, Türkiye could have been expected, in everyday terms, to adopt bolder texts protecting investors in draft treaties for negotiations with states over which it had greater diplomatic leverage.
V. The 2014 Model BIT
The January 2014 model adds chiefly two new provisions to the 2010 structure. The first allows a Contracting Party to deny the benefits of the treaty to a company and its investments where that company has no “substantial business activities” in its state of incorporation and is owned or controlled by investors of a third state or of the host state (denial of benefits).[81] Both the absence of activities and ownership or control must be established, and prior notification to the other Contracting Party is required “to the extent practicable”.[82] The second specifies the law applicable in arbitration: the treaty, the host state’s laws and regulations (including its conflict-of-laws rules), and the relevant principles of international law accepted by both Contracting Parties.[83] This model also expressly limits the exclusion from arbitration concerning immovable property to ownership and other rights in rem over immovable property within the territory of Türkiye.[84] The exclusive jurisdiction of Turkish courts over these matters existed in earlier models as well. The new wording clarifies an asymmetrical choice that does not exclude Turkish investors’ immovable property abroad.
VI. Inferences Concerning Model BITs After 2014
As explained in the first section, although the texts of post-2014 models are unavailable, UNCTAD records the existence of models dated 2016 and 2024.[85] Other models may, of course, also have been prepared.
Even so, it is possible to draw inferences about the content of later models. First, the Foreign Affairs Committee reports of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye on the treaties signed with Palestine (2018),[86] Hong Kong (2023)[87] and Iraq (2024)[88] state that Türkiye’s model formed the basis of those treaties. They may therefore serve as points of reference for later models. In addition, wording repeated to a large extent in most of the other treaties suggests that the 2014 model underwent certain changes. We discuss the identifiable changes below, broadly in the likely order of the relevant articles.
The first and most conspicuous change concerns the definition of investment. Later treaties retain an asset-based definition, but also require a protected asset to possess the characteristics of an investment. These include, by way of example, (i) the commitment of capital or other resources, (ii) the expectation of regular gain or profit, (iii) the assumption of risk, (iv) contribution to economic development, or (v) a certain duration.[89] A footnote added in most treaties explains that, if an asset lacks the characteristics of an investment, it does not qualify as an investment regardless of the form it may take.[90]
Under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, the contribution, duration, risk and contribution-to-economic-development criteria were discussed in Salini v. Morocco.[91] The last and most controversial of these[92] will inevitably confront Turkish investors abroad as the basis for jurisdictional objections. In this respect, we consider that omitting the criterion, as in the BITs signed with Guatemala and Georgia, would be more consistent with Türkiye’s position.
The addition of the characteristics of an investment to the definition is accompanied by the omission, from the great majority of later treaties, of the provision excluding shares or voting rights acquired through a stock exchange that represent less than ten per cent of a company’s capital or voting rights. Among the BITs listing the characteristics of an investment, this provision is retained only in the BIT signed with Burkina Faso.[93]
Compared with the 2014 model, many treaties add a paragraph at the end of the “General Exceptions” provision. According to this paragraph, the “adoption, maintenance or enforcement” of the measures referred to in that provision is subject to the requirement that they “are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner or do not constitute a disguised restriction on investments of investors of the other Contracting Party”.[94]
The interest payable in the event of delayed expropriation compensation appears to have changed from “the highest interest paid on public claims in the hosting Contracting Party” to “an appropriate interest rate from the date of expropriation until the date of payment”.[95]
The armed-conflict clause remained substantively unchanged from Türkiye’s first model in 2000 through the latest model whose full text is available, dated 2014.[96] A new paragraph appears to have been added to it thereafter.[97] The first paragraph provided that, with respect to measures addressing investment losses arising from war, insurrection, civil disturbance or similar events, investors would receive whichever of NT or MFN treatment was more favourable. Under the new second paragraph, without prejudice to the first, investors suffering losses from those events shall be accorded prompt, adequate and effective restitution or compensation where the losses result from (a) requisitioning of their property by the host state’s forces or authorities, or (b) destruction of their property by those forces or authorities where it was not caused in combat action or required by the necessity of the situation. The resulting payments must also be freely convertible.
The ability to restrict transfers relating to investments has been expanded. The 2010 and 2014 models permitted temporary restrictions where payments and capital movements caused or threatened to cause serious balance-of-payments difficulties, provided the restrictions were applied in a non-discriminatory manner and in good faith. A new paragraph in treaties signed from 2014 also permits transfers to be prevented through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good-faith application of laws and regulations concerning matters that vary from treaty to treaty.[98]
The provision on investor–state dispute settlement also appears to have changed. Most later treaties, add an opening paragraph stating that the investor–state dispute settlement article applies to disputes concerning an “alleged breach of an obligation” under the treaty “which causes loss or damage to the investor or its investments”.[99] It is again noteworthy that this change limiting investors’ access to arbitration was adopted in treaties signed with states receiving Turkish capital.
A new article entitled “Service of Documents” was added to many treaties signed after 2016.[100] It provides that notices and other documents sent to Türkiye in investor–state and inter-state disputes must be delivered to the Prime Ministry’s Department of Legal Services in treaties signed before the presidential system, and to the Presidency’s General Directorate of Law and Legislation in those signed afterwards. The stated reason for this addition was that sending requests for international arbitration to embassies or ministries unrelated to the matter wasted time in preparing for arbitration.[101]
These changes do not eliminate continuity with the 2014 model. For example, with respect to FET, the substantial repetition of the 2014 model’s formulation in later treaties signed with different states supports an inference that it was retained in subsequent models.[102] The approach of excluding dispute settlement from the MFN provision also continued, albeit in different wording.[103] Negotiation, the fork-in-the-road rule and the requirement that an investment have effectively commenced likewise remained conditions for arbitration. The post-2014 period is therefore a continuation of the earlier process of elaboration rather than a break. The changes are consistent with the trend towards clarifying standards and expressly preserving regulatory space.
VII. Assessment of Policy and Interpretation
The changes examined require consideration of Türkiye’s interests both as the home state of investors and as a host state. In a relationship principally involving capital exports, broader investor protection might be expected, but reciprocal obligations mean that the same provisions can also be invoked against Türkiye. Although Türkiye generally follows trends and case law, and the changes may have only a limited effect in practice, it could use its bargaining power more deliberately for the benefit of its investors abroad.
One possible explanation for the model revisions is Türkiye’s experience as a respondent state. The connection in subject matter and timing between the consent issue discussed in PSEG and the addition to the 2006 draft supports this explanation, but does not show that every revision was made for the same reason. The practical convenience of retaining a common starting draft and the risks created by reciprocal obligations are also possible explanations. We treat these as hypotheses that could be tested against negotiating documents or institutional statements, rather than as established policy objectives.
The interpretative value of model texts for older treaty provisions calls for similar caution. A later change may clarify the earlier meaning or alter the previous choice. To distinguish these possibilities, one must consider the old and new wording, any express reason for the change, the context of the relevant treaty and evidence of the parties’ shared understanding. A unilateral model text cannot, by itself, amount to subsequent practice establishing the parties’ agreement within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Any supplementary value under Articles 31–32 must be justified by showing its connection to the particular treaty.[104]
VIII. Conclusion
The 2000 model represents a period of traditional investor protection. Without changing the substantive standards, the 2005 and 2006 revisions first clarified the treaty’s temporal scope and then the subject-matter limits of consent to arbitration, while elaborating the conditions of access to arbitration. The 2009 model and 2010 revision made the substantive standards more specific; the 2014 draft added provisions such as denial of benefits and applicable law. Treaties signed from 2014 onward contain further provisions introduced at different times, including lists of the objective characteristics of an investment, conditions governing the application of general exceptions, direct restitution or compensation for specified losses in armed conflict, elaborated exceptions to transfers, and a definition tying arbitrable disputes to a treaty breach causing loss. These findings show continuity with the transition beginning in 2005 and the subsequent elaboration.
In investment policy terms, the picture is one of retaining traditional protections while defining scope and conditions of recourse more clearly. This tendency does not mean that every change operates solely in favour of host states. The territorial limitation concerning immovable property in the 2014 model and the clarification of the domestic-court option reveal different effects. The relative influence of capital movements, bargaining power and experience as a respondent state on these choices calls for research beyond textual comparison.
As a matter of interpretation, the development of model texts offers a supplementary source showing how the same subject was redrafted over time. Whether a change clarified an earlier meaning or made a new choice must be assessed alongside the wording and context of the relevant treaty and evidence of the parties’ common intention. Unilateral changes to models do not replace that inquiry; they can contribute to the formulation and testing of interpretative arguments. Broader access to the model texts will facilitate both historical study of Türkiye’s treaty practice and practitioners’ assessment of changes between provisions.
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[1] See UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements Navigator”, UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements, accessed 8 September 2026.
[2] Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 90–91; Chester Brown, “Introduction: The Development and Importance of the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty”, in Chester Brown (ed.), Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 2.
[3] Banu Şit Köşgeroğlu, “Model İkili Yatırım Anlaşmaları ve Türkiye’nin Model İkili Yatırım Anlaşması Taslağı” (“Köşgeroğlu”), Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, No. 107, 2013, p. 149.
[4] See Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic (“Enron v. Argentina”), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 14 January 2004, para. 46.
[5] Christoph Schreuer, “Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration”, Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2006, p. 8.
[6] Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 149–150.
[7] See generally UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements Navigator”, UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/model-agreements, accessed 8 September 2026.
[8] U.S. Department of State, “2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty”, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf, accessed 8 September 2026.
[9] Government of Canada, “Canada’s 2021 Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) Model”, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng, accessed 8 September 2026.
[10] Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, “Consulta publica BIT modelo colombiano”, MinCIT, https://www.mincit.gov.co/temas-interes/consulta-publica-bit-modelo-colombiano, accessed 8 September 2026.
[11] Michael Schmid, “Switzerland”, in Chester Brown (ed.), Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 659–660.
[12] Köşgeroğlu, p. 149, fn. [22].
[13] UNCTAD, “Turkey Model BIT 2000 (replaced)” (“2000 Model BIT”), UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2851/download, accessed 12 June 2026; UNCTAD, “Turkey Model BIT 2009 (replaced)” (“May 2009 Model BIT”), UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2852/download, accessed 12 June 2026.
[14] For example, UNCTAD’s website lists Türkiye’s 2016 and 2024 model BITs, although their texts have not been uploaded: UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements Navigator”, UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/model-agreements, accessed 8 September 2026. On Türkiye’s preparation of a new model BIT with UNCTAD’s assistance in 2010, see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, pp. 85, 96, fn. [16], https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2010_en.pdf, accessed 8 September 2026. On the existence of a 2005 model BIT, see OECD, International Investment Perspectives, OECD Publishing, 2006, p. 146. See also Bilgin Tiryakioğlu, “Extension of the Most Favoured Nation Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties Which Türkiye is a Party of” (“Tiryakioğlu”), Public and Private International Law Bulletin, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2023, p. 12.
[15] References to provisions common to both models use “2009 Model BITs”.
[16] In its reply to a subsequent information request, the Ministry confirmed that the 2000 text available through UNCTAD is the first model BIT in its archives. It declined to release models prepared after 2014 on the ground that disclosure could harm Türkiye’s economic interests. The other texts obtained from the Ministry are referred to here as the “2004 Model BIT”, “2005 Model BIT”, “2006 Model BIT”, “January 2010 Model BIT” and “January 2014 Model BIT”, respectively.
[17] 2000 Model BIT, art. II(2); 2004 Model BIT, art. II(2); 2005 Model BIT, art. II(2); 2006 Model BIT, art. II(2); 2009 Model BITs, art. 2(2); January 2010 Model BIT, art. 2(2); January 2014 Model BIT, art. 3(2).
[18] 2000 Model BIT, art. II(2); 2004 Model BIT, art. II(2); 2005 Model BIT, art. II(2); 2006 Model BIT, art. II(2); 2009 Model BITs, art. 2(2); January 2010 Model BIT, art. 2(2); January 2014 Model BIT, art. 3(2). The first six models use “full protection”; the January 2010 text uses “full protection (and security)”, and the January 2014 text “full protection and security”.
[19] 2000 Model BIT, art. III(2); 2004 Model BIT, art. III(2); 2005 Model BIT, art. III(2); 2006 Model BIT, art. III(2); 2009 Model BITs, art. 3(2); January 2010 Model BIT, art. 3(2); January 2014 Model BIT, art. 4(2).
[20] 2000 Model BIT, art. III(1); 2004 Model BIT, art. III(1); 2005 Model BIT, art. III(1); 2006 Model BIT, art. III(1); 2009 Model BITs, art. 3(1); January 2010 Model BIT, art. 3(1); January 2014 Model BIT, art. 4(1).
[21] 2000 Model BIT, art. IV(1); 2004 Model BIT, art. IV(1); 2005 Model BIT, art. IV(1); 2006 Model BIT, art. IV(1); 2009 Model BITs, art. 5(1); January 2010 Model BIT, art. 5(1); January 2014 Model BIT, art. 6(1).
[22] 2000 Model BIT, art. V; 2004 Model BIT, art. V; 2005 Model BIT, art. V; 2006 Model BIT, art. V; 2009 Model BITs, art. 7; January 2010 Model BIT, art. 7; January 2014 Model BIT, art. 8.
[23] 2000 Model BIT, art. VI; 2004 Model BIT, art. VI; 2005 Model BIT, art. VI; 2006 Model BIT, art. VI; 2009 Model BITs, art. 8; January 2010 Model BIT, art. 8; January 2014 Model BIT, art. 9.
[24] 2000 Model BIT, art. VII(2)(a); 2004 Model BIT, art. VII(2)(a); 2005 Model BIT, art. VII(2)(a); 2006 Model BIT, art. VII(2)(a); 2009 Model BITs, art. 9(2)(b); January 2010 Model BIT, art. 9(2)(b)(i); January 2014 Model BIT, art. 10(2)(b)(i).
[25] 2000 Model BIT, art. VII(2)(b); 2004 Model BIT, art. VII(2)(b); 2005 Model BIT, art. VII(2)(b); 2006 Model BIT, art. VII(2)(b); 2009 Model BITs, art. 9(2)(c); January 2010 Model BIT, art. 9(2)(b)(ii); January 2014 Model BIT, art. 10(2)(b)(ii).
[26] See Değer Boden and Yaren Yagdereli, “Investment Treaty Arbitration: Türkiye”, Global Arbitration Review, 11 August 2026, https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/investment-treaty-arbitration/report/turkey, accessed 13 September 2026, question 8.
[27] ICSID, “Contracting States and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention”, 19 August 2026, https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2026-08/2026_August19_ICSID8.pdf, accessed 8 September 2026, p. 12; 2006 Model BIT, art. VII(3)(a)–(b).
[28] 2000 Model BIT, art. I(2).
[29] 2000 Model BIT, art. I(2), final sentence. The general “direct investment” wording was retained in the 2004–2006 models and removed from the 2009 models. From 2009 onward, however, investments acquired through stock exchanges representing less than ten per cent of a company’s shares or voting rights were expressly excluded: 2009 Model BITs, art. 1(1); January 2010 Model BIT, art. 1(1); January 2014 Model BIT, art. 1(1).
[30] 2000 Model BIT, art. I(1).
[31] Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (“Maffezini”), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction dated 25 January 2000, paras. 54–56.
[32] For an express example of the international response to Maffezini, see Free Trade Area of the Americas (“FTAA”), “Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Draft Agreement, Chapter XVII”, 21 November 2003, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/ChapterXVII_e.asp, accessed 10 September 2026, fn. [13]: “The Parties note the recent decision of the arbitral tribunal in Maffezini (Arg.) v. Kingdom of Spain, which found an unusually broad most favored nation clause in an Argentina-Spain agreement to encompass international dispute resolution procedures. […] The Parties share the understanding and intent that [the most favored nation clause] does not encompass international dispute resolution mechanisms […] and therefore could not reasonably lead to a conclusion similar to that of the Maffezini case.”
[33] 2000 Model BIT, art. VII(2).
[34] For example, the 2004 Model BIT uses “Contracting Parties” instead of “Parties”, and “admit” instead of “permit”. In the 2000 model, Article VI(3)’s reference, concerning disputes involving a subrogated insurer, to the inter-state dispute settlement provision (Article VIII) was redirected in 2004 to the investor–state provision (Article VII). We consider that this corrected an earlier cross-reference error.
[35] 2005 Model BIT, art. IX: “… this Agreement shall not apply to any disputes that have arisen before its entry into force.”
[36] 2006 Model BIT, art. III(4).
[37] 2006 Model BIT, art. VII(3)(a)–(c).
[38] ICSID, “Contracting States and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention”, 19 August 2026, https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2026-08/2026_August19_ICSID8.pdf, accessed 8 September 2026, p. 12. Under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention, states may notify ICSID of the class or classes of disputes which they would or would not consider submitting to its jurisdiction. The provision also specifies that such a notification does not constitute consent to arbitration.
[39] PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgın Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Ltd. Şti. v. Republic of Turkey (“PSEG”), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 4 June 2004, paras. 135–147.
[40] Tolga Bayrak, “Türkiye’nin Davalı Olarak Yatırım Tahkimi Karnesi”, in Mehmet Helvacı et al. (eds.), Galatasaray Liseli Hukukçuların Cumhuriyetin 100. Yılına Armağanı, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, 2023, p. 402.
[41] Id.
[42] Türkiye–France BIT (2006), Protocol, statement concerning art. 8.
[43] Türkiye–Saudi Arabia BIT (2006), art. 10(3).
[44] Türkiye–Oman BIT (2007), art. 9(4)(a)–(b).
[45] 2009 Model BITs, art. 4(1). Subparagraph (a) of the March text uses “necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or the environment”, whereas the May text uses “designed and applied for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or the environment”.
[46] 2009 Model BITs, art. 4(2).
[47] 2009 Model BITs, art. 5(2).
[48] On the police powers doctrine, see Catharine Titi, “Police Powers Doctrine and International Investment Law”, in Andrea Gattini, Attila Tanzi and Filippo Fontanelli (eds.), General Principles of Law and International Investment Arbitration, Brill Nijhoff, 2018, pp. 323–343.
[49] Methanex v. United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award dated 3 August 2005, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7; Saluka v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award dated 17 March 2006, paras. 255, 262.
[50] 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Annex B, para. 4(b); 2004 Canada Model FIPA, Annex B.13(1)(c).
[51] 2009 Model BITs, art. 5(2). The January 2010 Model BIT, art. 5(2), omits the final phrase expressly excluding compensation, “and are not subject, therefore, to any compensation requirements”, but that omission does not itself establish an obligation to compensate.
[52] 2009 Model BITs, art. 1(1).
[53] March 2009 Model BIT, art. 1(2)(b).
[54] May 2009 Model BIT, art. 1(2)(b).
[55] May 2009 Model BIT, art. 3(4)(c). For an example from a signed BIT, see Türkiye–Montenegro BIT (2012), art. 3(4)(c).
[56] For an example of this approach, see Bayindir v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award dated 27 August 2009, paras. 156–157. Cf. Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath, “The New Debate on the Interpretation of MFN Clauses in Investment Treaties: Putting the Brakes on Multilateralization”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 111, No. 4, 2017, pp. 892–893. For another critique of importing substantive protections, see Facundo Pérez-Aznar, “The Use of Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses to Import Substantive Treaty Provisions in International Investment Agreements”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2017, pp. 777–805.
[57] 2009 Model BITs, art. 9(2)–(3).
[58] 2009 Model BITs, art. 9(4)(a)–(b).
[59] January 2010 Model BIT, art. 2(2).
[60] Türkiye–Tanzania BIT (2011), art. 2(2); Türkiye–Azerbaijan BIT (2011), art. 2(2).
[61] January 2010 Model BIT, art. 4.
[62] January 2010 Model BIT, art. 3(4)(c).
[63] 2009 Model BITs, art. 5(2): “… and are not subject, therefore, to any compensation requirements”. The final phrase does not appear in the January 2010 Model BIT, art. 5(2).
[64] 2009 Model BITs, art. 5(4): “… an interest at a rate to be agreed upon by both parties unless such rate is prescribed by law from the date of expropriation until the date of payment.” January 2010 Model BIT, art. 5(4): “… an interest rate equivalent to the highest interest paid on public claims in the hosting Contracting Party.”
[65] January 2010 Model BIT, art. 7(3).
[66] NAFTA Free Trade Commission, “Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions”, 31 July 2001, “Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law”, paras. 1–2.
[67] 2004 U.S. Model BIT and 2004 Canada Model FIPA, art. 5.
[68] CAFTA-DR (2004), art. 10.5.
[69] ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (2009), art. 11(2)(a)–(b).
[70] Glamis Gold v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award dated 8 June 2009, paras. 614–616.
[71] Mondev v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award dated 11 October 2002, paras. 116–125.
[72] Waste Management II v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award dated 30 April 2004, para. 98.
[73] L. Fay H. Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v. United Mexican States, Decision dated 15 October 1926.
[74] Railroad Development Corporation v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award dated 29 June 2012, paras. 218–219.
[75] Türkiye–Turkmenistan BIT (1992), Türkiye–Pakistan BIT (1995) and Türkiye–Syria BIT (2004), art. VII(2): the six-month amicable settlement period and separate one-year period for domestic courts.
[76] Kılıç İnşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan (“Kılıç”), ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, Decision on Article VII.2 dated 7 May 2012, para. 9.14.
[77] Rumeli Telekom and Telsim v. Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award dated 29 July 2008, para. 317.
[78] Kılıç, Decision on Article VII.2 dated 7 May 2012, para. 9.23; Award dated 2 July 2013, paras. 6.2.6–6.2.9, 6.3.15, 10.1.1.
[79] Muhammet Çap & Sehil v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objection under Article VII(2) dated 13 February 2015, paras. 280–282.
[80] İçkale v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Award dated 8 March 2016, paras. 261–263.
[81] January 2014 Model BIT, art. 11(1).
[82] Id., art. 11(2).
[83] Id., art. 10(5).
[84] Id., art. 10(4)(b).
[85] See UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements Navigator”, UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/model-agreements, accessed 28 September 2026.
[86] Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, “Tekirdağ Milletvekili Mustafa Şentop’un Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Filistin Devleti Hükümeti Arasında Yatırımların Karşılıklı Teşviki ve Korunmasına İlişkin Anlaşma ve Anlaşmada Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Notaların Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Teklifi (2/2370) ve Dışişleri Komisyonu Raporu”, https://cdn.tbmm.gov.tr/KKBSPublicFile/D27/Y3/T2/DosyaKomisyonRaporunuVerdi/4cfaec76-6881-493a-9ce8-9ec9ce4b50b0.pdf, accessed 28 September 2026, p. 7: “temel olarak, ülkemizin model anlaşmasının esas alındığı” (essentially based on our country’s model agreement).
[87] Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, “İstanbul Milletvekili Numan Kurtulmuş’un Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Hong Kong Özel İdari Bölgesi Hükümeti Arasında Yatırımların Karşılıklı Teşviki ve Korunmasına İlişkin Anlaşmanın Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Teklifi (2/2639) ve Dışişleri Komisyonu Raporu”, https://cdn.tbmm.gov.tr/KKBSPublicFile/D28/Y3/T2/DosyaKomisyonRaporunuVerdi/c898d080-9574-4462-89e6-4f9a8f187c1b.pdf, accessed 28 September 2026, p. 9: “büyük ölçüde ülkemiz taslak metnine dayandığı” (largely based on our country’s draft text).
[88] Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, “İstanbul Milletvekili Numan Kurtulmuş’un Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Yatırımların Karşılıklı Teşviki ve Korunmasına İlişkin Anlaşmanın Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Teklifi (2/2344) ve Dışişleri Komisyonu Raporu”, https://cdn.tbmm.gov.tr/KKBSPublicFile/D28/Y2/T2/DosyaKomisyonRaporunuVerdi/ed7751e2-c320-47c2-97d1-a4a9d0c0cacb.pdf, accessed 28 September 2026, p. 8: “ülkemiz taslağına dayanmakta olduğu” (based on our country’s draft).
[89] Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Somalia BIT (2016), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Moldova BIT (2016), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Mozambique BIT (2017), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Burundi BIT (2017), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Ukraine BIT (2017), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Chad BIT (2017), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2018), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Belarus BIT (2018), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Lithuania BIT (2018), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Palestine BIT (2018), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Burkina Faso BIT (2019), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Angola BIT (2021), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Uruguay BIT (2022), art. 1(1); Türkiye–Iraq BIT (2024), art. 1(1). The Türkiye–Guatemala BIT (2015), art. 1(1), is the first example of this formula, but does not list contribution to economic development among the characteristics. The Türkiye–United Arab Emirates BIT (2023), art. 1(9), lists neither economic contribution nor a certain duration. The Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2022), art. 1(1), adds the flow of capital and technology between the Contracting Parties to all the listed characteristics. The Türkiye–Georgia BIT (2016) and Türkiye–Uzbekistan BIT (2017), art. 1(1), use different formulations; the Georgia treaty also omits contribution to economic development. The characteristics of an investment are also listed in the Türkiye–Colombia BIT (2014), art. 1(4), but this provision appears to derive from Colombia’s model. See UNCTAD, “Colombia Model BIT 2011”, UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/3559/download, accessed 21 September 2026, art. 2.4.
[90] Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 1(1), fn. [1]; Türkiye–Somalia BIT (2016), art. 1(1), fn. [1]; Türkiye–Moldova BIT (2016), art. 1(1), fn. [1]; Türkiye–Mozambique BIT (2017), art. 1(1), fn. [1]; Türkiye–Burundi BIT (2017), art. 1(1), fn. [1]; Türkiye–Ukraine BIT (2017), art. 1(1), fn. [1]; Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2018), art. 1(1), fn. [1]; Türkiye–Palestine BIT (2018), art. 1(1), fn. [1]; Türkiye–Iraq BIT (2024), art. 1(1), fn. [1]. For the same clarification in the main text, see Türkiye–Belarus BIT (2018), art. 1(1).
[91] Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco (“Salini”), ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 23 July 2001, para. 52. The definition of investment in a BIT and the criteria for an investment under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention are distinct legal inquiries. The point here is that criteria discussed in connection with the Convention are incorporated, in whole or in part, into the treaty’s definition of investment.
[92] For an example rejecting contribution to economic development as a criterion, see Saba Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award dated 14 July 2010, paras. 110–111. Salini, para. 52, notes that the elements are interrelated and must be assessed together; they are not an immutable list automatically applicable to every BIT.
[93] See the treaties listed in footnote 89 above. Türkiye–Burkina Faso BIT (2019), art. 1(1).
[94] Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Georgia BIT (2016), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Moldova BIT (2016), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Mozambique BIT (2017), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Burundi BIT (2017), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Uzbekistan BIT (2017), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Chad BIT (2017), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Belarus BIT (2018), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Mauritania BIT (2018), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Palestine BIT (2018), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Burkina Faso BIT (2019), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Congo BIT (2021), art. 5(3); Türkiye–Iraq BIT (2024), art. 5(3). For a different first paragraph, see Türkiye–United Arab Emirates BIT (2023), art. 6(3).
[95] Türkiye–Côte d’Ivoire BIT (2016), art. 6(4); Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 6(4); Türkiye–Somalia BIT (2016), art. 6(4); Türkiye–Mozambique BIT (2017), art. 6(4); Türkiye–Burundi BIT (2017), art. 6(4); Türkiye–Ukraine BIT (2017), art. 6(4); Türkiye–Palestine BIT (2018), art. 6(4); Türkiye–Burkina Faso BIT (2019), art. 6(4); Türkiye–Congo BIT (2021), art. 6(4); Türkiye–Angola BIT (2021), art. 8(5); Türkiye–United Arab Emirates BIT (2023), art. 7(5). For interest of at least six-month LIBOR, see Türkiye–Uzbekistan BIT (2017), art. 6(4). For interest over the period of delay of at least LIBOR, see Türkiye–Belarus BIT (2018), art. 6(4). Türkiye–Iraq BIT (2024), art. 6(4), refers to “an appropriate commercial interest rate from the date of expropriation until the date of payment”.
[96] The clause was initially the final paragraph of the article entitled “Expropriation and Compensation”: 2000 Model BIT, art. IV(3); 2004 Model BIT, art. IV(3); 2005 Model BIT, art. IV(3); 2006 Model BIT, art. IV(3). From 2009 it appears as a separate article entitled “Compensation for Losses”: 2009 Model BITs, art. 6; January 2010 Model BIT, art. 6; January 2014 Model BIT, art. 7.
[97] Türkiye–Sudan BIT (2014), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Colombia BIT (2014), art. 8(2); Türkiye–China BIT (2015), art. 6(2); Türkiye–Côte d’Ivoire BIT (2016), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Ghana BIT (2016), art. 10(2); Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Somalia BIT (2016), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Georgia BIT (2016), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Rwanda BIT (2016), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Moldova BIT (2016), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Mozambique BIT (2017), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Burundi BIT (2017), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Ukraine BIT (2017), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Uzbekistan BIT (2017), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Chad BIT (2017), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2018), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Belarus BIT (2018), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Mauritania BIT (2018), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Mali BIT (2018), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Kyrgyzstan BIT (2018), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Zambia BIT (2018), art. 8(2); Türkiye–Lithuania BIT (2018), art. 9(2); Türkiye–Palestine BIT (2018), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Burkina Faso BIT (2019), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Angola BIT (2021), art. 8(2); Türkiye–Congo BIT (2021), art. 7(2); Türkiye–Uruguay BIT (2022), art. 9(2); Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2022), art. 7(2); Türkiye–United Arab Emirates BIT (2023), art. 9(2); Türkiye–Venezuela BIT (2023), art. 8(2); Türkiye–Hong Kong BIT (2023), art. 6(2); Türkiye–Iraq BIT (2024), art. 7(2).
[98] Türkiye–Sudan BIT (2014), art. 8(4); Türkiye–Colombia BIT (2014), art. 9(3); Türkiye–Guatemala BIT (2015), art. 8(4); Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 8(3); Türkiye–Georgia BIT (2016), art. 8(4); Türkiye–Rwanda BIT (2016), art. 8(4); Türkiye–Uzbekistan BIT (2017), art. 8(3); Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2018), art. 8(3); Türkiye–Belarus BIT (2018), art. 8(4); Türkiye–Lithuania BIT (2018), art. 10(3); Türkiye–Cambodia BIT (2018), art. 7(4); Türkiye–Angola BIT (2021), art. 9(3); Türkiye–Uruguay BIT (2022), art. 10(3); Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2022), art. 8(3); Türkiye–Venezuela BIT (2023), art. 9(3); Türkiye–Hong Kong BIT (2023), art. 8(3). The Türkiye–Palestine BIT (2018), art. 8(3), limits temporary restrictions on transfers in the event of balance-of-payments difficulties to the application of laws relating to the matters listed in that article. This provision is absent from the treaty signed with Iraq in 2024, which is described as based on Türkiye’s model.
[99] Türkiye–Guatemala BIT (2015), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Somalia BIT (2016), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Georgia BIT (2016), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Rwanda BIT (2016), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Moldova BIT (2016), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Mozambique BIT (2017), art. 11(1); Türkiye–Burundi BIT (2017), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Ukraine BIT (2017), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Chad BIT (2017), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2018), art. 13(1); Türkiye–Belarus BIT (2018), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Mauritania BIT (2018), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Lithuania BIT (2018), art. 13(1); Türkiye–Burkina Faso BIT (2019), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Angola BIT (2021), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Congo BIT (2021), art. 10(1); Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2022), art. 12(1); Türkiye–United Arab Emirates BIT (2023), art. 13(1). The Türkiye–Uruguay BIT (2022), art. 12(1), adds “hereinafter referred to as ‘investment dispute’” after the same definition. A footnote to the same definition in the Türkiye–Hong Kong BIT (2023), art. 14(1), fn. [4], clarifies that “Only disputes arising out of an investment made in conformity with the laws and regulations of the host Contracting Party and that has effectively started shall be subject to this Article.” For a broader definition, see Türkiye–Uzbekistan BIT (2017), art. 10(1).
[100] Türkiye–Côte d’Ivoire BIT (2016), art. 13; Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 13; Türkiye–Somalia BIT (2016), art. 13; Türkiye–Moldova BIT (2016), art. 13; Türkiye–Mozambique BIT (2017), art. 14; Türkiye–Burundi BIT (2017), art. 13; Türkiye–Ukraine BIT (2017), art. 13; Türkiye–Chad BIT (2017), art. 13; Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2018), art. 15; Türkiye–Mauritania BIT (2018), art. 13; Türkiye–Lithuania BIT (2018), art. 15; Türkiye–Palestine BIT (2018), art. 13; Türkiye–Burkina Faso BIT (2019), art. 13; Türkiye–Angola BIT (2021), art. 14; Türkiye–Congo BIT (2021), art. 13; Türkiye–Uruguay BIT (2022), art. 16; Türkiye–Serbia BIT (2022), art. 15; Türkiye–United Arab Emirates BIT (2023), art. 16; Türkiye–Venezuela BIT (2023), art. 17; Türkiye–Hong Kong BIT (2023), art. 16; Türkiye–Iraq BIT (2024), art. 13.
[101] Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, “Tekirdağ Milletvekili Mustafa Şentop’un Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Moldova Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Yatırımların Karşılıklı Teşviki ve Korunmasına İlişkin Anlaşmanın Notalarla Birlikte Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Teklifi (2/3053) ve Dışişleri Komisyonu Raporu”, https://cdn.tbmm.gov.tr/KKBSPublicFile/D27/Y3/T2/DosyaKomisyonRaporunuVerdi/54ded840-78d4-4dd5-859e-820067952ea8.pdf, accessed 23 September 2026, p. 8.
[102] Türkiye–Côte d’Ivoire BIT (2016), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 3(4); Türkiye–Somalia BIT (2016), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Georgia BIT (2016), art. 3(3); Türkiye–Rwanda BIT (2016), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Moldova BIT (2016), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Mozambique BIT (2017), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Burundi BIT (2017), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Ukraine BIT (2017), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Chad BIT (2017), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Belarus BIT (2018), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Mauritania BIT (2018), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Kyrgyzstan BIT (2018), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Zambia BIT (2018), art. 4(1); Türkiye–Palestine BIT (2018), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Cambodia BIT (2018), art. 2(2); Türkiye–Burkina Faso BIT (2019), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Angola BIT (2021), art. 3(2); Türkiye–Congo BIT (2021), art. 3(2).
[103] Of these, the wording in the treaties with Côte d’Ivoire, Jordan and Somalia (2016), and Mozambique, Burundi and Ukraine (2017) is, in view of its frequency and the dates of those treaties, the most likely to have been adopted in the 2016 model. Türkiye–Côte d’Ivoire BIT (2016), art. 4(4)(c); Türkiye–Jordan BIT (2016), art. 4(3)(c); Türkiye–Somalia BIT (2016), art. 4(4)(c); Türkiye–Mozambique BIT (2017), art. 4(4)(c); Türkiye–Burundi BIT (2017), art. 4(4)(c); Türkiye–Ukraine BIT (2017), art. 4(4)(c).
[104] On considering the model underlying a signed treaty among the circumstances of its conclusion under Article 32, see Garanti Koza v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Decision on the Objection to Jurisdiction for Lack of Consent dated 3 July 2013, para. 36.
